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1. Introduction 
In many countries it has been observed that the supply of labor seems to depend on business cycle 
fluctuations. That is, it is commonly believed that the labor supply is higher when the labor market is 
tight than when it is slack, where slackness is represented by the unemployment rate. One popular 
explanation of this phenomenon is that during a recession, workers become discouraged and give up 
searching for work. Economists view this as the result of workers believing that their chances of 
finding a job are so low that the implied monetary and psychological costs of searching yield a utility 
of searching that is lower than the utility of being out of the labor force (as perceived by the worker). 
An additional source of business cycle variation in labor supply may be variations in individual wage 
rates.  
 
The observation that the labor supply seems to vary according to the business cycle has given rise to 
the "discouraged worker" concept. A discouraged worker is one who is not searching for work under 
the current business cycle conditions, but otherwise would have been searching if the chances of 
obtaining an acceptable job were sufficiently high. Although the discouraged worker concept has been 
around for a long time (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1988), there are surprisingly few studies based on 
microdata that address this issue within a structural framework.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze married or cohabiting women's decisions on labor force 
participation and employment in a way that explicitly accommodates the discouraged worker effect 
within a structural setting. In particular, we wish to establish behavioral relations that enable us to 
analyze the effect on labor supply behavior as a result of changes in the probability of obtaining a 
suitable job. Our point of departure is a simple search model that is used as a theoretical rationale to 
motivate the structure of the utility of looking for work. From this theoretical characterization, an 
empirical model is developed and represented by the probabilities of not participating in the labor 
force, working, and being unemployed, respectively. Our approach enables us to characterize these 
probabilities in terms of market wage rates, demographic factors, nonlabor income, and the probability 
that an acceptable job offer is available given that the woman searches for work. 
 
Empirical micro studies that analyze the effect of unemployment on labor supply include Ham (1986), 
Blundell, Ham, and Meghir (1987, 1998), Connolly (1997), and Başlevent and Onaran (2003). 
Bloemen (2005) estimates an empirical job search model with endogenously determined search 
intensity. The paper that is closest in spirit to our work is Blundell, Ham, and Meghir (1998), 
henceforth BHM (1998). However, our analysis departs from BHM (1998) in several aspects. First, 
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whereas they analyze labor force participation, employment, and hours of work, we analyze only 
employment and labor force participation. Thus, in one aspect, our modeling assumptions are weaker 
than in BHM (1998) because we do not specify an hours of work relation. Because we do not address 
the supply of hours of work relation, we are unable to distinguish between concepts such as the fixed 
cost of working and search costs. This is in contrast to BHM (1998), who address this issue. Second, 
we extend earlier search theoretic approaches by showing how one can conveniently allow for non-
pecuniary job attributes in our formulation. This is an important extension. Remember that in the 
standard search theoretic formulation one cannot identify the arrival rate of job offers and the 
distribution of wages of the incoming job offers without additional strong functional form assumptions 
(Flinn and Heckman, 1982, pp. 121−125), unless one has data on actual job offers. In our context, 
where jobs are characterized by both wages and non-pecuniary attributes the value of arriving job 
offers is unobservable, and the researcher thus faces an additional challenge when specifying empirical 
structural relations. In our paper we show that our assumptions imply an interesting and useful explicit 
functional form characterization of the utility of being unemployed as a function of the search cost, the 
arrival rate of acceptable job offers, and the utility of being employed. This is the main theoretical 
contribution of our paper and it yields a characterization that is particularly useful for motivating the 
specification of the empirical model. Finally, we propose a particular version of Heckman's method of 
correcting for selectivity bias in the estimation of the wage equation that applies when participation in 
the labor force is modeled by a logit model (cf. Heckman, 1979). 
 
Our approach also differs from the one employed by Bloemen (2005) in that we base our empirical 
model on simpler assumptions about the agent’s knowledge and ability to account for future uncertain 
events (job arrivals and layoffs). However, in another sense our approach is more general in that it is 
consistent with a setting in which the agent accounts for non-pecuniary aspects of the jobs.  
 
The empirical model is estimated on a sample of independent cross-sections of married and cohabiting 
women in Norway, for each quarter from the second quarter of 1988 to the fourth quarter of 2008.1 
The reason why we focus on married women is that this subgroup of persons is most responsive to 
market incentives. As regards the discouraged worker effect, we find that, on average, about one third 
of the married women outside the labor force are discouraged.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the theoretical framework is developed and the 
general structure of the choice model is obtained. In Section 3, the discouraged worker effect is 
                                                     
1 To simplify the verbal exposition, we refer to both these types of females as married in the rest of the paper. 
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defined formally within our structural setting and in Section 4 the empirical version of the model is 
specified. Section 5 contains a description of the data, and the estimation procedure and estimation 
results are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 reports elasticities and simulation results, including 
selected elasticities for different population groups as well as for all women in different periods.  
2. The model 
In this section, we build on a simple theoretical framework that subsequently will enable us to 
formulate an empirical model for individuals’ labor supply behavior as a function of the probability of 
obtaining an acceptable job. Specifically, we shall apply search theory to obtain a characterization of 
the option value of being unemployed. Note that an agent who decides to search for work may have to 
stay unemployed for some time before an acceptable job offer arrives. This requires that the agent is 
able to evaluate the utility of the respective job offers and to judge whether or not they are acceptable.  
 
Consider now what happens when an unemployed agent is searching for a job. The agent is viewed as 
being uncertain about her opportunities in the labor market and about the utility of arriving job offers. 
Jobs are characterized by (real) wages and non-pecuniary attributes. Job offers have utilities that are 
i.i.d., and job offers arrive according to a Bernoulli process at discrete time epochs. This means that at 
most one offer arrives at each time epoch. From the agent’s point of view the randomness is due to 
future uncertain job-specific wages and non-pecuniary attributes. Examples of non-pecuniary aspects 
are; job-specific tasks to be performed, job-specific fixed hours of work, location of the job, and 
quality of the social and physical environment of the job. The notion of non-pecuniary attributes is 
similar to Lancaster’s characteristic approach, see Lancaster (1971). The uncertainty about job 
attributes is assumed to be revealed upon inspection once a job offer has been received. Thus this 
setting is different from the typical job matching models such as those used by Jovanovic (1979) 
where it is assumed that there is an unknown match quality that is revealed gradually to the firm and to 
the worker after the job has been accepted. The job arrival rate and the distribution of the random 
component of the utility function are assumed known by the agent. At a given point in time, the agent 
behaves as if future job arrival rates and the distribution of the utilities of potential jobs do not change 
(stationary case). However, the agent may in each period revise her perception about the job arrival 
rate and the distribution of the random component of the utility of the job offers. In general, we view 
the assumption of stationary search environment as a more realistic assumption than a non-stationary 
setting since the agent hardly has much information about future changes in real wages and the 
distribution of job types. Thus, the best she can do is to make utility evaluations based on the 
assumption that the current situation will prevail for some time. However, in the typical situation 
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where unemployment benefits have a limited duration, known by the agent, the stationarity 
assumption is clearly restrictive and unrealistic. Unfortunately, without the stationary assumption the 
model will be rather complicated and intractable for empirical analysis. Moreover, the agent is also 
assumed bounded rational in the sense that she ignores the possibility of changing job or being laid off 
in the future when evaluating the value of search. This, of course, does not mean that she will never 
consider changing job in the future. It simply means that she is unable to (or does not care) to account 
for the uncertainty with respect to future job loss when evaluating the current value of search. Also, 
for the same reason, we assume that when the agent is out of the labor force, she receives no job 
offers. 
 
Let λ  be the probability of a job offer arrival at a given time and let V denote value of search. 
Following Lippman and McCall (1976),2 it follows readily that  
 
(1) 2(1 ) max( , ) ,V V E V U cλ λ= − + −  
 
where E  denotes the subjective expectation operator, 2U  is the utility of the arriving job offer and c is 
the search cost. Here, the search cost is to be interpreted as disutility of search and it is never fully 
observable. A major part of the disutility of search may consist of psychological factors such as search 
effort and persistence. Eq. (1) says that the present value of searching for work is evaluated as follows: 
When searching, two things can happen in a period. With (subjective) probability 1 λ−  no job offer 
arrives at the current epoch so that the expected utility in this case equals V times 1 λ−  Otherwise, a 
job offer arrives at the current epoch with probability λ , in which case expected utility equals 
2max( , ).E V Uλ   Finally, the cost of searching equals .c  After rearranging (1) we obtain 
(2) ( )2max , .cV E V U λ= −  
Eq. (2) is quite intuitive. When the optimal policy is determined by (2) one may interpret 2U as the 
lump sum value of the job offer over the infinite horizon. The expected interval between two job 
arrivals is equal to 1/λ. Consequently, c/λ is the expected search cost until a job arrives. Thus, V is 
equal to the expectation of the maximum of the utility of working and the utility of searching minus 
the expected cost of searching until a job arrives.  
 
                                                     
2 For a thorough survey of search models see Rogerson et al. (2005). 
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Although the relation in (2) is of theoretical interest it is not directly applicable for empirical analysis. 
For the sake of developing a tractable empirical model we shall in the following introduce further 
assumptions. Recall that the utility 2U  depends on the (real) wage rate and non-pecuniary attributes of 
the job. However, for the purpose of this section it is sufficient to assume the following representation 
(3) 2 2 ,U v ξ τω= + +  
where 2v  is the mean utility across agents, τ  is a positive constant, ξ  is a term that is supposed to 
capture the effect of unobservables (to the researcher) affecting the utility, and ω  is a zero mean 
random term, with c.d.f. F, that is continuous, strictly increasing and has unit variance. However, ξ  is 
perfectly certain to the individual agent. In contrast, the term ω  is uncertain to the agent, and is thus 
perceived as a random variable to both the agent and the researcher.3 Unfortunately, the researcher can 
not separate the two sources of randomness, ξ  and .τω  Nevertheless, we need to use the 
representation (3) (or a similar one) to make our theoretical discussion precise and to facilitate the 
subsequent empirical specification in Section 4. The c.d.f. F, as well as τ, may be individual-specific, 
and we assume (with no loss of generality) that F has support with the upper bound equal to .ω   
 
Let ( ) max(0, ).H u E uω∗ = −  By straightforward integration by parts, it follows that  
 
(4) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
max 0, max 0, ( ) ( )
| ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) .
u
u u u
E u E u x u dF x
x u F x F x dx F x dx
ϖ
ϖ ϖϖ
ω ω− = − = −
= − − − + − = −

 
 
 
 
Since F is strictly increasing it follows by differentiation that ( )H u∗  is strictly decreasing and convex 
for .u ω<  Consequently, the inverse function H of H ∗  exists and ( )H y  is strictly decreasing and 
convex. If we insert (3) into (2) and rearrange, we obtain 
(5) 
( ) ( )
( )( )
2 2
2
2
max 0, max 0,
max 0, .
c E U V E v V
V vE V v H
τω ξλ
ξ
τ ω ξ τ τ
τ
∗
= − = + + −
− − 
= − − − =   
 

 
                                                     
3 The reason why we introduce τ in the notation is that we later wish to study the effect of changing the variance of tτω while 
keeping the distribution of ω fixed. 
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Hence, it follows that one can express V as 
(6) 2 .
c cV V v Hξ τλ τλ
   
= = + +        
 
Note that the function ( )H y  neither depends on 2v  nor .ξ  Moreover, one can easily show that 
(0) .H ω=  
 
It is of interest to consider the special case in which the agent is indifferent about job attributes, real 
wages are the same for all jobs and the only source of uncertainty is whether or not she will get a job 
offer. This case can be obtained by letting the degree of uncertainty, as represented by τ, decrease 
towards zero. Then (4) reduces to ( )2max 0,v V cξ λ+ − = , from which it follows that in the case 
without uncertainty about the value of the jobs, one obtains 
(7) 2
c cV U  = −  λ λ . 
 
In this case, where the agent's option value of being unemployed is given by Eq. (7), she will accept 
the first offer that arrives.  
 
To clarify further the interpretation and intuition of the model we consider next the case whenτ → ∞ . 
Then Eq. (5) implies that V tends towards infinity. The intuition is that since the left hand side of Eq. 
(5), λ/c , is finite, then the distribution of )( 2 ξτω −−− vV  must remain bounded when τ  increases; 
this can only happen if V tends towards infinity. The interpretation is that when the job offer 
distribution F  has unbounded support, then when τ  increases, the chances of receiving a very 
valuable job offer increases, and therefore the value of searching will increase. Similarly, when 0τ >  
and the search cost c decreases towards zero, ( )H cτ τλ  will increase to (0) .Hτ τω=  The intuition is 
that when it costs very little to search, the agent will find it worthwhile to search for a “long time” 
before accepting a job offer. 
 
The fact that the utility V depends on λ  through the transformation H makes the interpretation of Eq. 
(6) less transparent. Recall also that in the standard search model where jobs are identified by job-
specific wages, the distribution of wages and the job arrival rate cannot be identified with data on 
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durations and accepted wages unless strong and typically unjustified functional form assumptions are 
imposed, cf. Flinn and Heckman (1982, pp. 121−125). Thus, empirical applications based on Eq. (6), 
or similar restrictions derived from search theory, are difficult and controversial because the functional 
form of F, or equivalently of the function H, are typically selected in an ad hoc way. It would therefore 
be desirable to express V in a way that does not depend on H. Surprisingly, this is in fact possible, 
although only in an approximate way. To this end, note first that one can express the probability that a 
job is acceptable as 
(8) ( )2 2 2 1 ,c cP U V P v v H F Hτω ξ ξ τ τλ τλ
      
> = + + > + + = −            
   
 
where P  indicates that the probability is conditional on the agent's information. Moreover, by implicit 
differentiation of ( ( ))H H x x∗ =  it follows that 
(9) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )2
1 1 1' .
' ( ) 1 ( )
cH
P U VH H c F H cτλ τλ τλ∗
 
= = − = −  >−    
 
By first order Taylor expansion of the function H(x) around the point / ,c τλ  we obtain that  
 
(10) ( ) ' .c c cH x H H x
τλ τλ τλ
    
≅ + −          
 
This Taylor expansion is valid for positive x, but since ( )H x is continuous at x = 0, Eq. (10) will also 
hold for x = 0. Hence, for x = 0, Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) imply that we can rewrite Eq. (6) as  
(11) 2 (0) ,
c cV v V
q q
ξ τω
∗ ∗
≅ + + − = −  
 
where 2( )tq P U Vλ∗ = >  is the arrival intensity of the acceptable jobs (conditional on the agent’s 
information). In the general case the convexity of H implies by well known results that 
 (0) ' ,c cH H H
τλ τλ
   ≤ +        
 
which implies that the right hand side of Eq. (11) is an upper bound of V. 
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The relation obtained in Eq. (11) is the main theoretical result of this section. The intuition of the 
relation is as follows: First, since job offers arrive according to a Bernoulli process, with parameter λ , 
then also the acceptable job offers arrive according to a Bernoulli process. This is quite intuitive.4 This 
implies that the expected length of time until the next acceptable job arrival equals 1/ .q∗  
Consequently, /c q∗  is the expected search cost (or disutility) until an acceptable job offer arrives. 
Thus V is equal to the utility of search with no search costs (equal to the utility of being employed) 
minus the expected cost of searching until an acceptable job offer arrives. Eventual unemployment 
benefits enter this model through c.5 To the best of our knowledge, Eq. (11) does not seem to have 
appeared previously in the literature.  
 
In contrast to Eq. (6), Eq. (11) depends on the business cycle fluctuations through an observable term 
,q∗  and in addition, V is linear as a function of *1/ ;q  that is, no nonlinear transformation is involved. 
 
The structure of the utility of search given in Eq. (11) is intuitive because it corresponds to a 
reasonable assumption about search behavior of a bounded rational agent who is able to form 
expectations about search costs, the expected value of arriving jobs given information about the arrival 
rate of acceptable jobs and the distribution of the random component of the job-specific utilities. The 
role of the search theoretic development above is two-fold: First, it serves to demonstrate that a 
version of the search theoretic approach can be adapted and modified to obtain an empirical tractable 
version, in contrast to the standard approach that in our context will depend too heavily on 
unobservable terms. Second, the approximation in Eq. (11) is close if /c τλ  is small, but it may be 
crude if this is not the case, which means that the theoretical support for Eq. (11) may be weak if /c τλ  
is not small. Nevertheless, since our decision rule in Eq. (11) appears quite plausible because it has 
such a clear and intuitive interpretation, we feel confident to base our empirical analysis on this 
relation. 
 
                                                     
4 For the sake of completeness a formal proof is given in Appendix B. In the same appendix we also prove that the expected 
time until the first acceptable offer is equal to 1/ .q∗  
5 The level of unemployment benefits depend on previous employment/unemployment spells and may therefore be 
endogenous. Consequently, it is not trivial to include benefits as an independent variable. In any case, in our data set we do 
not have separate information on benefits. 
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3. The discouraged worker effect  
In this section we propose a formal definition of the discouraged worker effect. First, we need to 
define a “reference” regime with “low” unemployment. As reference regime, we choose a setting in 
which ,λ = ∞  which means that the worker receives job offers instantly upon search. This setting 
implies that there will be no unemployment. Although this evidently is an idealized setting, which will 
never occur in practice, we nevertheless believe that it serves as a natural reference case. Since λ = ∞  
implies that / 0,c λ =  with corresponding value of search equal to (0),V  we immediately obtain that a 
worker is discouraged when 
(12) 2(0)V v ξ τω= + + 0 2c cU V v H   > > = + +      ξ τλ λτ , 
 
where 0U  is the worker’s utility of being out of the labor force and (0)H  is equal to the upper bound 
ω  of the support of .F  The term (0)V  can be interpreted as the highest possible level of the value of 
searching for work, occurring when /c λ = 0. The first inequality above says that the worker would 
like to search for work if the job arrival intensity λ is infinite, or c = 0, whereas the second inequality 
says that she will not search under the current labor market conditions. Note that if the upper bound 
,ω = ∞  then (0)H = ∞ , which means that no agent would be out of the labor force in this case with 
zero expected cost of search. 
 
When taking into account the approximation given in Eq. (11) the condition for being discouraged, as 
given in Eq. (12), becomes 
(13) 0(0) (0) .
cV U V
q∗
> > −  
4. Empirical specification 
We shall now discuss how we can use the results obtained above to formulate an empirical model for 
individuals’ assignment to the following 3 states: “Out of the labor force” (state 0), “Unemployed” 
(state 1), and “Employed” (state 2). Although we are primarily interested in a model for the probability 
of supplying labor (being in the labor force), we need to specify a complete model for the 3 states 
above for the purpose of efficient use of the information available in the data. Recall that in the 
treatment above, we only considered uncertainty from the perspective of the individual agent. In 
contrast, when specifying the empirical model, we need in addition to take into account variables that 
are known by the individual agent, but unobserved by the econometrician (unobservables).  
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Let W  denote the real wage that corresponds to the job offer with utility 2U  and assume that  
 
(14) 2 log ,U W ζ= +  
 
where ζ  is a term that represents the value of non-pecuniary aspects of the job offer. The term ζ  may 
vary across agents due to heterogeneity in agents' preferences. We call exp( )W ζ  the modified wage. 
The modified wage takes into account that non-pecuniary aspects also matter to the agents. Thus, an 
attractive job with respect to non-pecuniary aspects corresponds to a high value of .ζ  Hence, the 
agent may accept this job even if the wage rate is low as long as the modified wage is high.  
In our data we only observe the current wage of those who work, that is, the wage conditional 
on acceptable job offers. Therefore, we need to specify a (real) wage equation and an estimation 
procedure for recovering the unconditional distribution of the real wage. To this end we assume that 
(15) 0log ,W Xβ β η= + +   
 
where X consists of length of schooling, experience, experience squared and a variable representing 
regional population density, and η  is a zero mean random variable that is independent of X  and has 
variance 2.σ  Experience is defined as age minus schooling (number of years) minus school start. 
Here, we allow the intercept 0β in the real wage equation to depend on calendar time. If we combine 
Eq. (3) with Eq. (14) and Eq. (15) it follows that  
 
(16) 2 0 ,v X= +β β   
 
whereas ξ τω+  has the interpretation as .ξ τω η ζ+ ≡ +  Note that whereas the value of search, V , is 
known to the agent, it is not observable to the researcher and may vary across agents due to 
unobservables. Also, q∗  is not necessarily observed by the researcher. What the researcher observes is 
q, defined as the aggregate fraction of employed (or equivalently unemployed) persons in the labor 
force. Thus, 0( | ).q E q V U
∗
= >  Consequently, we can express V as 
(17) 2 2 ,
cV v
q
ε= − +  
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where 2ε  is a random term defined by  
2
c c
q q
ε ξ τω
∗
= + + − . 
 
Furthermore, assume that  
(18) 0 0 0U v= + ε , 
 
where 0v is a systematic term that depends on observed individual characteristics, whereas 0ε  is a 
random error term that is supposed to account for the effect of unobservables. In the following, we 
will assume that ( )0 2,θε θε  are jointly standard extreme value distributed (see Appendix C) and 
serially independent, where θ  is a suitable positive parameter whose role is to standardize the 
standard deviations of , 0,2.j j =ε  Moreover, we assume that 0 ,v Z= −θ γ  where Z is a vector of 
variables consisting of one, age, age squared, the logarithm of real nonlabor income, and three 
variables representing the number of children with age less than 3 years, number of children with age 
between 4 and 6 and number of children with age above 6 in the household. The real nonlabor income 
variable is the husband’s income. Since labor supply decisions of wife and husband are interdependent 
this raises the question to what extent this variable is endogenous. To deal with interdependent 
household labor supply properly requires a model for joint labor supply of wife and husband, which 
will, however, be beyond the scope of this paper. Note furthermore that length of schooling is not 
included in Z. This is consistent with the standard labor supply literature. Although there are grounds 
for including length of schooling in Z this would lead to serious identification problems.6  
 
Without loss of generality we can normalize such that 2ε has the same mean as 0.ε  The assumptions 
above and the theory of discrete choice imply that the probability of being in the labor force equals 
(19) ( )0 2 2 0 0cP P V U P v vq
 
≡ > = − + ε > + ε  
 
 ( )( )2
1
1 exp (1/ 1v Z c q
=
+ − θ + γ − −
, 
 
                                                     
6 In a standard life cycle setting, v0 will depend on some measure of permanent or lifetime income (through the marginal 
utility of wealth). Furthermore, for obvious identification reasons we follow the convention in labor supply analysis by not 
allowing preferences to depend on education.  
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where ,c cθ=  and where we have replaced 1/q by 1/ 1.q − 7 Since Z γ  contains an intercept this 
substitution represents no loss of generality. Although the choice probability follows from well known 
results (see for example McFadden, 1984), we provide a proof in Appendix C to make the paper self-
contained. There we also demonstrate that there is no loss of generality in assuming that the error 
terms 0ε and 2ε  are independent.  
 
To complete the empirical specification we need a model of the probability q, i.e., the probability of 
facing an acceptable job given that the individual searches. We are unfortunately not able to give a 
structural specification of q that explicitly accounts for the fact that q depends on both preferences and 
on the job arrival rate. Instead we assume the following reduced form representation 
(20) ( )
1
1 exp
q
B
=
+ − δ , 
 
where B is a vector consisting of length of schooling, experience, experience squared, number of 
children in three age groups, logarithm of real nonlabor income, and time dummies. This specification 
is sufficient for the purpose of this paper, since the role of q is to serve as an instrument variable that 
enables us to predict the probability of getting unemployed for subgroups defined by the vector .B  
Note that 1 q− corresponds to the probability of getting unemployed for agents with characteristics .B   
 
It is easily realized that there is no identification problem here because our data set contains 
information about which of the three states “out of the labor force”, “unemployed” and “employed”, 
the agent occupies at time t. The relation in (20) can therefore be identified from the subsample of 
persons who are in the labor force (i.e., employed or unemployed). Specifically, the dependent 
variable that is relevant for estimating (20) is equal to one if the agent is employed and zero if the 
agent is unemployed. However, since all the individual covariates represented by X and Z also enter 
the vector B in q, identification is achieved because of B contain time dependent dummy variables 
representing business cycle variations.8 
 
We have estimated the model by a simultaneous quasi-maximum likelihood procedure, to be discussed 
in Section 6. Alternatively, one could estimate the model in several stages. By this we mean that q  is 
                                                     
7 This normalization is convenient because it implies that the term (1/ 1)c q −  vanishes when q = 1. 
8 It may be possible in principle to achieve identification without business cycle variations in q. This identification will 
however depend crucially on the functional form of q, and therefore be fragile. 
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estimated in a first stage, and that we use the estimated value as an independent variable together with 
the other explanatory variables, to estimate the probability of being in the labor force in a second 
stage, given by (19). This requires that the (real) wage equation has been estimated first. In the 
estimation of the wage equation one faces a potential selection bias problem. In Appendix C it is 
demonstrated that one can use log P−  as an additional regressor to control for selection bias in the 
(real) wage equation. Hence, a reduced form specification of (19) can be used to obtain an estimate of 
log P . Consequently, one can thereby identify the parameters of the wage rate equation, which 
determines 2.v  Recall that whereas 2v  depends on length of schooling, Z  does not contain length of 
schooling. Hence, since q  is observable, and 21 1,q v−  and Z are not linearly dependent, the 
parameters θ, ,c and γ  in (19) are identified. Consequently, the model is identified.  
 
Finally, let us consider the implication for the prediction of the discouraged worker effect. When 
1,q = we have “full” employment. From (19) we thus get that the probability of being discouraged 
equals 
(21) ( )( ) ( )( )2 2
1 1(1) ( ) .
1 exp 1 exp (1/ 1)
P P q
v Z v Z c q
− = −
+ − θ + γ + − θ + γ − −   
5. Data 
The data were obtained by merging the Labor Force Survey (LFS) 1988–2008 and three different 
register data sets—the Tax Register for personal tax payers 1988–1992, the Tax Return Register 
1993–2008, and the National Education database—with additional information about incomes, family 
composition, children, and education.9 Information about whether the person lives in a densely 
populated area is also linked to the dataset. The classification in the LFS is based on answers to a 
broad range of questions. Persons are asked about their attachment to the labor market during a 
particular week. For a person to be defined as unemployed, she must not be employed in the survey 
week, she must have been seeking work actively during the preceding four weeks, and she must wish 
to return to work within the next two weeks. 
 
Information about actual and formal working times in a worker's main job, as well as in a possible 
second job, and background variables such as demographic characteristics and occupation are also 
included in the LFS. Conditional on labor market participation, respondents are asked whether they 
                                                     
9 This is possible owing to a system with unique personal identification numbers for every Norwegian citizen. 
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consider themselves as self-employed or as employees. Based on this information, we have excluded 
self-employed women in the empirical analysis. Working time is measured as formal hours of work on 
an annual basis in both the main and possible second job. If this information is missing and the 
respondent is participating in the labor market, information about actual working time is used. The 
actual sample we use is a subset of the LFS and consists of independent cross-sections for all years 
from 1988 (second quarter) to 2008 (fourth quarter). A woman in the sample is observed in one 
quarter only. 
 
In order to expand the analysis period of this study, we use data (incomes, demographic 
characteristics, family composition) from both the Tax Register 1988−2002 and the Tax Return 
Register 1993-2008. Unfortunately, the Tax Register for personal taxpayers (which is an register with 
selected income and tax variables) does not include very detailed information about different types of 
incomes. We have chosen to use a measure of nonlabor income that includes salaries of the husband as 
well as stipulated labor incomes for self-employed husbands. Nominal hourly wages are measured as 
labor incomes divided by (formal) annual working time, as defined above. The nominal hourly wage 
and nonlabor income variables are deflated by using the official Norwegian consumer price index, 
with 1998 as the base year.  
 
The number of children aged 0−3 years, 4−6 years and 7−18 years for the years 1993−2008 can easily 
be calculated from information in the Tax Return Register using information on family identification 
number, date of birth and information about whether a person is considered being a child or an adult in 
the family. Since the Tax Register does not include information about persons less than 18 years, we 
have to predict the number of children in the three age groups for the years 1988−2002. This is done 
by extrapolating information about the number of children in all ages 0−23 in 2003 year by year, from 
2002 and back until 1988. The predicted age distributions of children for the years 1988 to 2002 looks 
very similar to the observed age distribution in 2003 using this procedure.  
 
Education is measured in years of achieved level of schooling. An area is defined as densely populated 
if at least 200 persons live in the area and the distance from one house to another normally is less than 
50 meter.  
 
The sample is further reduced by including only married or cohabiting females ranging in age between 
25 and 60 years. The motivation for the age restriction is that education is an important activity for 
women under 25 years of age, and that for those older than 60 years, early retirement is rather fre-
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quent.10 Married women with zero nonlabor income are also excluded from the sample. Moreover, 
married women with real nonlabor income higher than one million NOK in real terms are also ex-
cluded. This leaves us with a final sample for all years of 57,440 females used in the estimation of the 
model. The average proportion of women outside the labor force is 12.1 percent (6,953 females), the 
average unemployment rate is 2.1 percent (1,202 females), and the average employment rate is 85.8 
percent (49,285 females). In the estimation we have removed real wage observations where either the 
real wages are below the 3rd percentile or above the 99th percentile. However, we have not removed the 
corresponding women with these wages. As a result, the set of observations that enter the part of the 
loglikelihood function that concerns real wages is reduced from 49,285 to 47,329 employed women.  
 
Two characteristics are evident in the sample: There has been an upward trend in female labor market 
participation over the period, and the unemployment share shows business cycle fluctuations over the 
years covered by the sample. In Appendix D, Table D1, we report the share of total number of persons in 
different labor market states for each year in the time span 1988–2008. Furthermore, in Table D2 of that 
Appendix we report summary statistics on an annual basis for the variables used in our econometric 
analysis. Table 1 reports, as an example, a segment of these two extensive tables corresponding to 1995. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics in 1995 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum No. of obs. 
Share of employed persons 0.8394    4,017 
Share of unemployed persons 0.0286    4,017 
Real wagea  117.53 40.83 44.22 395.67 3,221 
Real nonlabor incomea 198,030 92,512 148,36 669,920 4,017 
Age 40.99 9.18 25 60 4,017 
Length of schooling 11.85 2.67 6 20 4,017 
Number of children aged 0−3 years 0.31 0.56 0 3 4,017 
Number of children aged 4−6 years 0.23 0.47 0 3 4,017 
Number of children aged 7−18 years 0.76 0.93 0 5 4,017 
Dummy for densely populated areab 0.76 0.43 0 1 4,017 
a NOK (in constant 1998 prices). bThe dummy variable is equal to 1 if the person is from a densely populated 
area, otherwise it is 0. 
 
                                                     
10 Norway has an early retirement program for workers. It was introduced for the first time in 1988, originally only for 66 
years old workers working in firms that were participating in the program. Today the program covers most workers aged 
62−66 years. 
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6. Estimation and empirical results 
In this section we report estimation procedures and estimation results. Recall that the individual at any 
time is in one of the 3 states “Out of the labor force” (state 0), “Unemployed” (state 1) and 
“Employed” (state 2). To this end it is convenient to introduce individual- and time indexation. Let 
ijtP
∗  be the probability that individual i is in state j in period t. Clearly, 2 ,i t it itP q P
∗
=  1 (1 ) ,i t it itP q P
∗
= −  
and 0 1 .i t itP P
∗
= −  In Appendix C we demonstrate that the (real) wage equation for woman i at time t 
who works can be written as 
 
 *0log log ,it t it it itW X Pβ β ρ η= + − +  
 
where ρ is a positive parameter and the random error term *itη  has zero mean (conditional on working 
and given the regressors). All the parameters of the model have been estimated simultaneously, 
including the selection bias parameter ρ . We use a quasi-maximum likelihood approach to this end 
since we do not know the distribution of the error term *itη . Even if one makes distributional 
assumptions about the error term itη  in the original wage equation one cannot infer much about the 
distribution of *itη  without making specific assumptions about the joint distribution of 2( , ).i t itε η  The 
Figures D1 and D2 in Appendix D provide evidence that support the assumption that the distribution 
of this error term is close to the normal distribution. Thus, we have formed the quasi-likelihood 
function as if the error term *itη  were normally distributed. 
 
Let 1ijtY =  if woman i is in state j in year t, and zero otherwise. The log quasi-likelihood function is 
given by (apart from an additive constant) 
(22) [ ]( )2 22 0log log log log 2 log .ijt ijt i t it t it it
i t j i t
L Y P Y W X Pβ β ρ σ σ∗= − − − + +   
 
Although all the parameters of the model are estimated simultaneously, we find it convenient to present 
the results in different tables. The estimates of the parameters in the (real) wage equation and in qit are 
reported in Table A1 and Table A2 in Appendix A, respectively, whereas the results for the structural 
parameters (of the participation probability) are presented in Table 2. From Table A1, we observe that 
the sample selection variable has an insignificant effect. The effects of schooling and experience are 
consistent with findings in previous analyses using Norwegian data (see, for example, Dagsvik and 
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Strøm, 2006). In agreement with our a priori belief we find, ceteris paribus, that females living in densely 
populated areas have higher expected real wage rates than females living in sparsely populated areas. 
 
Recall that since 0( | ),q E q V U
∗
= >  q depends on the variables that enter λ , V and 0U . According to the 
results in Table A2, both length of schooling and (potential) work experience have a positive effect on the 
probability of getting an acceptable job, conditional on search. The presence of children reduces this 
probability. This may be because utility of nonparticipation increases with the number of children. This, in 
turn, implies that it is less likely that a woman with children will decide that an arriving job is acceptable 
compared to a woman with no children. In addition, we find that an increase in (real) nonlabor income 
increases the probability of finding a job conditional on search. If labor market skills and qualifications are 
positively correlated among partners, we expect to find high correlation between the real nonlabor income 
of the female and her qualifications in the labor market In this case we would expect that the job arrival 
rate λ (which is a component of q) may be correlated with real nonlabor income.11 
 
Figure 1. Mean of predicted probabilities of being unemployed 1988−2008. In percent 
100x(1-q) 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
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1.0
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11 From the outset we included the dummy for densely populated area in the expression for q. However, since the estimated 
coefficient attached to this variable was highly insignificant it was dropped in the final estimation. As a sensitivity check we 
have also estimated the complete model when the 21 annual dummies are replaced by 83 quarterly dummies. Whereas the 
loglikelihood value in the maintained model is 9,595.77, the log-likelihood value of this alternative model is 9,613.14. Given 
the number of degrees of freedom gained, this may be interpreted as support for the maintained model. The estimates of the 
other parameters in the model do not vary substantially between these two specifications.  
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In Table 2, we report, for the sake of comparison, both the estimation results of the structural model 
and the results of a constrained model where it is assumed a priori that the discouraged worker effect 
does not enter the model. Apart from a significant loss of explanatory power, the most striking feature 
is the higher coefficient associated with the predicted log real wage rate, and the reduced coefficient 
(in absolute value) associated with log real nonlabor income. This means that when we ignore the dis-
couraged worker effect, we overestimate the effects of changes in wages on participation, whereas the 
effects of changes in nonlabor income are underestimated. All the estimates in Table 2 related to the 
maintained model have the a priori expected signs. Apart from the estimate of the coefficient attached 
to the first order term of age, they are all significant.12 Utilizing the parameter estimates in Table A2 
we may predict the probability of being unemployed for each woman in the sample. In Figure 1 we 
graph the annual mean of 100(1-q), i.e., the annual mean of perceived probabilities of getting unem-
ployed given in percent. As can be seen from Figure 1, this variable shows business cycle variation 
over time which is of vital importance from an empirical point of view when estimating the discour-
aged worker effect.  
 
Table 2. Maximum likelihood estimates of key structural parameters characterizing the  
participation probability  
With discouraged worker 
effect 
Without discouraged worker 
effect Para-meter Variable 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
θ Predicted log real wage 4.1293 22.2685 5.5067 43.4264 
γ1 Intercept −10.5602 −9.5639 −21.8942 −36.1267 
γ2 Age −0.0274 −1.2168 0.0563 3.4298 
γ3 (Age/10)2 −0.0547 −2.1339 −0.1388 7.2388 
γ4 log(real nonlabor income) −0.2884 −10.7158 −0.0900 −5.7080 
γ5 Number of children aged 0−3 years −1.0466 −24.3394 −1.0340 −35.4472 
γ6 Number of children aged 4−6 years −0.6929 −15.2760 −0.7576 −25.4533 
γ7 Number of children aged 7−18 years −0.2734 −11.2493 −0.3526 −21.4700 
c  Discouraged worker effect 19.0884 9.5468 0a  
Number of observations 57,440 57,440 
Log-likelihood value 9,595.77 9,512.10 
a A priori restriction. 
 
                                                     
12 A previous study by Dagsvik, Kornstad, and Skjerpen (2006) based on a similar model, and a sample of microdata from 
1988 to 2002 produced somewhat different empirical results. This is due to different specification of the variables 
representing the number of children in different age groups and the fact that the new data set covering the period from 1988 
to 2008 covers additional major business cycle variations. 
 21
7. Elasticities and various model predictions 
We will now investigate some key properties of the estimated structural model. In Table 3, we com-
pare, on a three year period basis, the mean of the predicted labor market participation probabilities 
and the corresponding empirical labor market participation shares (cf. the second and fourth column of 
the table, respectively).13 Our parsimonious model does rather well in picking up the positive trend in 
female labor market participation over the years covered by the sample. The mean of the absolute 
value of the deviations taken over the seven 3-years periods from 1988–2008 is about 0.006. The larg-
est deviation, 0.008, is found for the period 1991−1993.  
 
Table 3. Participation rates and discouraged worker effect 
Mean of predicted participation rates and discouraged worker effect 
Participation rate Discouraged worker effect No wage trenda 
Period 
Observed 
partici-
pation 
rate 
Observed 
unemploy-
ment rate 
Estimate
Std. 
err.b Estimate Std. err.b 
Share of 
discour. 
personsc Estimate Std. err.b 
1988−1990 0.8138 0.0194 0.8114 0.0160 0.0764 0.0076 0.3645 0.8017 0.0170 
1991−1993 0.8500 0.0283 0.8417 0.0140 0.0685 0.0067 0.3766 0.8003 0.0174 
1994−1996 0.8682 0.0262 0.8607 0.0121 0.0570 0.0054 0.3493 0.8090 0.0164 
1997−1999 0.8939 0.0175 0.8893 0.0110 0.0389 0.0048 0.2986 0.8245 0.0168 
2000−2002 0.9140 0.0136 0.9130 0.0092 0.0275 0.0036 0.2674 0.8357 0.0164 
2003−2005 0.9267 0.0222 0.9214 0.0085 0.0325 0.0039 0.3347 0.8218 0.0175 
2006−2008 0.9427 0.0112 0.9509 0.0059 0.0162 0.0024 0.2507 0.8522 0.0158 
1988−2008 0.8790 0.0209 0.8748 0.0113 0.0498 0.0047 0.3292 0.8171 0.0165 
a This column corresponds to the case where the estimates are taken from the maintained model, but where the 
estimates of the dummy variables in the (real) wage equation for 1989–2008 are all replaced by the estimated 
value of the dummy variable for 1988. b Bootstrap estimates. The number of replications is equal to 5,000. The 
bootstrapped standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping new parameter values from the multivariate normal 
distribution with the mean equal to the estimated coefficient vector and with the covariance matrix equal to the 
estimated covariance matrix of the parameter estimates. c The share of persons outside the labor force that is 
discouraged workers, according to the model. For each of the indicated periods we calculate the mean of [P(1)-
P(q)]/[1-P(q)] over the women. 
 
To assess the magnitude of the discouraged worker effect, we have in the sixth column of Table 3 
predicted the mean of P(1)-P(q) in different time periods. Furthermore, we have in the 
eight column of Table 3 predicted the share of women outside the work force that are discouraged 
workers. This share is computed as the mean (over women in the respective time periods) of the 
predicted ratios [P(1)-P(q)]/[1-P(q)]. Recall that P(1) is a “reference” case that corresponds to an ideal 
situation in which the agent perceives with perfect certainty that she will get an acceptable job if she 
                                                     
13 Our primary reason for reporting figures for three years periods is to reduce the sampling uncertainty such that we may 
obtain more precise estimates of the share of discouraged workers reported in the third last column of Table 3. 
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decides to search, whereas the second probability is the one that follows from the maintained model. 
As seen from the last row of the table, the global predicted mean increases by about 0.05, which 
implies that, on average, about one third of those outside the labor force are discouraged as reported in 
the third last column of Table 3. The share shows some variation through the periods.  
 
In the column of Table 3 next to the last, we have simulated labor supply behavior in the 
counterfactual case with real wage rates generated by the wage equation with the intercept as in 1988. 
As a consequence, the increase in labor force participation from 1988−1990 to 2006−2008 reduces to 
about 5 percentage points. Most of this increase in labor force participation is due to increased 
education levels, increasing real wage levels and reduced unemployment during the sample period 
considered in this analysis.  
 
Next, consider elasticities, which are characterized by being invariant to the arbitrary choice of units 
of measurement in both variables. In this section, we calculate a different type of elasticities. We use 
so-called quasi-elasticities (see Cramer, 2001, p. 8). The motivation for this is that “probability” is 
itself a relative concept and its scale is not arbitrary. The individual quasi-wage and quasi-nonlabor 
elasticities of the participation rate are given by, respectively14  
(23) ( )( ) 1 ( ) ( )
log
P
EW
P qE P q P q
EW
θ∂≡ = −
∂
 
and 
(24) ( )
4 4
4
( ) 1 ( ) ( ),PZ
P qE P q P q
Z
γ∂≡ = −
∂
 
 
where Z4 denotes the log of real nonlabor income. Note that here it is understood that the real wage 
rate changes we have in mind are solely changes in the mean of the distribution of the logarithm of the 
real wage rate. The quasi-elasticity of the participation rate with respect to the probability of not 
receiving an acceptable job offer,15 is given by 
                                                     
14 Note that it follows from Eq. (15) that log log ,EW E W δ= + where δ  is a suitable constant. This implies that 
( ) / log ( ) / log .P q EW P q E W∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂   
15 Using a nickname we refer to this as an unemployment elasticity. As both P and (1–q) are probabilities and hence 
dimensionless, we find it consistent with Cramer's intuition to label the derivatives in Eqs. (23) - (28) quasi-elasticities. 
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(25) ( )(1 ) 2( ) 11 ( ) ( ) .(1 )
P
q
P qE c P q P q
q q−
∂
≡ = − −
∂ −
  
 
Furthermore, we define the quasi-elasticities of the discouraged worker effect with respect to the same 
three variables as 
(26) ( ) ( )(1) ( ) 1 (1) (1) 1 ( ) ( ) ,
log log
D
EW
P P qE P P P q P q
EW EW
θ∂ ∂  ≡ − = − − − ∂ ∂  
 
(27) ( ) ( )
4 4
4 4
( )(1) 1 (1) (1) 1 ( ) ( )D iZ
P qPE P P P q P q
Z Z
γ∂∂  ≡ − = − − − ∂ ∂  
and 
 
(28) (1 ) (1 )
(1) ( ) .
(1 ) (1 )
D P
q q
P P qE E
q q− −
∂ ∂
≡ − = −
∂ − ∂ −
 
 
In columns 2−4 in Table 4, we report for selected years the annual mean of the quasi-wage ( PEWE ), the 
quasi-nonlabor income (
4
P
ZE ), and the quasi-unemployment elasticity (
P
uE ) which measure the effects 
on participation (Eqs. 23−25), and the corresponding quasi-elasticities of the discouraged worker 
effect (Eqs. 26−28) in the sample.16 For instance, let us consider the mean participation elasticities in 
1988 and 2008. In 1988, the mean quasi-elasticities for real wage, real nonlabor income, and 
unemployment are 0.60, –0.042, and –4.15, respectively, whereas the corresponding figures for 2008 
are 0.15, –0.011, and –0.79. From Table 3, we note that the mean predicted labor force participation 
rate is 0.80 in 1988 and 0.96 in 2008. If we counterfactually assume a 5 percent universally increase in 
the real wage rate in 1988, the mean predicted participation rate would have increased to 0.83. 
Correspondingly, a 10 percent universal increase in real nonlabor income would have lowered the 
mean predicted participation rate by 0.004. Finally, if all the predicted perceived unemployment rates 
had been increased by 0.05, the mean predicted labor participation probability would have decreased 
to 0.59. If we make the same type of calculations for 2008, the changes in the mean predicted 
participation probabilities in the three counterfactual situations would have been about 0.008, –0.001, 
                                                     
16 Estimates of mean quasi-elasticities of all years in the time span 1988–2008 are provided in Table D4 in 
Appendix D. 
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and –0.040, respectively. Over the time span considered in this analysis, there is a positive trend in 
female labor participation, and this leads to a negative trend in the mean quasi-wage elasticity over 
time. The mean quasi-nonlabor income elasticity is rather small in magnitude. The quasi-
unemployment elasticity, which picks up the discouraged worker effect, shows business cycle 
variation over time. Ceteris paribus, the quasi-unemployment elasticity will become higher as the 
perceived probability of being unemployed given search efforts becomes higher.  
 
Table 4. Mean quasi-elasticities of labor market participation and discouraged worker effect  
Quasi-elasticity of participation probability, P(q)a 
Quasi-elasticity of discouraged worker 
effect, P(1)-P(q)b 
 
Year 
P
EWE  4
P
ZE  (1 )
P
qE −  
D
EWE  4
D
ZE  
1988 0.6011 −0.0420 −4.1457 −0.1883 0.0131 
1995 0.4570 −0.0319 −2.9659 −0.1580 0.0110 
2002 0.2992 −0.0209 −1.7016 −0.0943 0.0066 
2008 0.1536 −0.0107 −0.7889 −0.0370 0.0026 
a Cf. Eqs. (23) – (25) for formal definition of the quasi-elasticities; b Cf. Eqs. (26) – (27) for formal definition of the quasi-
elasticities. 
 
One advantage of using microdata in structural analysis is that it allows the researcher to assess the 
importance of population heterogeneity when partial effects from changes in exogenous variables are 
considered. In Table 5, we report simulations of quasi-elasticities related to real wage, real nonlabor 
income, and the probability of getting unemployed for 31 different groups of females. In addition to 
the quasi-elasticities of participation defined in (23)-(25), we also report elasticities of the discouraged 
worker effect given by (26) and (27) (two last columns), similarily to what we did in Table 4.17 The 
cases differ with respect to combinations of real wage rate (100 and 200 NOK in constant 1998-
prices), real nonlabor income (100,000 and 300,000 NOK), age (30 and 45 years), the number of 
children in different age groups (0−3, 4−6 and 7−18 years) and the probability of getting an acceptable 
job, given search (q equal to 0.92, 0.97, and 1, respectively). The values for age, number of children in 
different age groups and q are chosen in order to embrace the possible variation in these variables. A 
level of real wages of 100 NOK corresponds to the lower wage rate deciles in Norway. A probability 
of getting a job, given search, equal to 0.97 is close to the situation in Norway today, whereas the 
probability 0.92 is considered to be a rather extreme case in Norway, but not in many other European 
countries.  
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Table 5. Probability of being in the labor force and quasi–elasticities of labor market participation and discouraged 
worker effect for different groups of females 
 
Number of children 
Quasi–elasticity of 
participation probability, 
P(q)b 
Quasi–elasticity of 
discouraged worker 
effect, P(1)–P(q)c 
Case 
 
 
Real 
wage 
ratea 
 
Real 
non– 
labor 
incomea 
Age
aged 
0−3 
years 
aged 
4−6 
years 
aged 
7−18 
years
Proba-
bility of 
getting an 
acceptable 
job, given 
search, q
Probability 
of labor 
force 
participa-
tion, P(q)
P
EWE 4
P
ZE  PuE  
D
EWE 4
D
ZE
1 100 100,000 30 0 0 0 0.92 0.897 0.382 –0.027 –2.087 −0.296 0.021
2 100 100,000 30 0 0 0 0.97 0.962 0.151 –0.011 –0.741 −0.064 0.004
3 100 100,000 30 0 0 0 1 0.979 0.087 –0.006 –0.400 
4 100 100,000 30 0 1 0 0.92 0.813 0.628 –0.044 –3.429 −0.462 0.032
5 100 100,000 30 0 1 0 0.97 0.927 0.280 –0.020 –1.376 −0.114 0.008
6 100 100,000 30 0 1 0 1 0.958 0.166 –0.012 –0.767 
7 100 100,000 30 1 0 0 0.92 0.753 0.768 –0.054 –4.192 −0.540 0.038
8 100 100,000 30 1 0 0 0.97 0.899 0.375 –0.026 –1.843 −0.147 0.010
9 100 100,000 30 1 0 0 1 0.941 0.228 –0.016 –1.054 
10 100 100,000 30 0 2 1 0.92 0.623 0.970 –0.068 –5.296 −0.588 0.041
11 100 100,000 30 0 2 1 0.97 0.828 0.588 –0.041 –2.887 −0.206 0.014
12 100 300,000 30 1 0 0 0.92 0.690 0.884 –0.062 –4.826 −0.584 0.041
13 100 300,000 30 1 0 0 0.97 0.866 0.478 –0.033 –2.350 −0.179 0.012
14 100 300,000 30 0 2 1 0.92 0.546 1.023 –0.071 –5.589 −0.537 0.038
15 100 300,000 30 0 2 1 0.97 0.778 0.713 –0.050 –3.501 −0.226 0.016
16 200 100,000 30 1 0 0 0.92 0.982 0.074 –0.005 –0.407 −0.060 0.004
17 200 100,000 30 1 0 0 0.97 0.994 0.026 –0.002 –0.129 −0.012 0.001
18 200 100,000 30 0 2 1 0.92 0.967 0.133 –0.009 –0.728 −0.107 0.007
19 200 100,000 30 0 2 1 0.97 0.988 0.048 –0.003 –0.235 −0.021 0.001
20 200 300,000 30 1 0 0 0.92 0.975 0.101 –0.007 –0.551 −0.081 0.006
21 200 300,000 30 1 0 0 0.97 0.991 0.036 –0.002 –0.176 −0.016 0.001
22 200 300,000 30 0 2 1 0.92 0.955 0.179 –0.012 –0.975 −0.142 0.010
23 200 300,000 30 0 2 1 0.97 0.984 0.065 –0.005 –0.320 −0.028 0.002
24 100 300,000 45 0 0 0 0.92 0.694 0.877 –0.061 –4.789 −0.582 0.041
25 100 300,000 45 0 0 0 0.97 0.869 0.471 –0.033 –2.315 −0.177 0.012
26 100 300,000 45 0 2 1 0.92 0.302 0.870 –0.061 –4.750 0.007 −0.000
27 100 300,000 45 0 2 1 0.97 0.557 1.019 –0.071 –5.006 −0.142 0.010
28 200 300,000 45 0 0 0 0.92 0.975 0.099 –0.007 –0.540 −0.079 0.006
29 200 300,000 45 0 0 0 0.97 0.991 0.035 –0.002 –0.172 −0.015 0.001
30 200 300,000 45 0 2 1 0.92 0.883 0.426 –0.030 –2.328 −0.327 0.023
31 200 300,000 45 0 2 1 0.97 0.957 0.172 –0.012 –0.843 −0.073 0.005
a In NOK (1998–prices); b Cf. Eqs. (23)–(25) for formal definition of the quasi–elasticities; c Cf. Eqs. (26)–(27) for formal 
definition of the quasi–elasticities. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
17 In Table D5 in Appendix D, we report results for an additional number of cases as well as most of the cases in Table 5. 
 26
Participation probabilities 
As seen from formulae (23)-(28), the levels of the participation probabilities have a major impact on 
the value of the quasi-elasticities. Specifically, we note that an increase in the probability of labor 
market participation decreases the absolute value of the quasi-elasticities in most cases.  
 
Labor market participation rates (column for P(q), Table 5) and the elasticities are strongly influenced 
by the real wage rate, and the higher the real wage rate is, the higher is the participation rate. For 
instance, if we consider a 30 years old woman, with one child aged 0−3 years, real nonlabor income 
equal to 100,000 NOK and q=0.97 (Case 8 and Case 17), an increase in the real wage rate from 100 
NOK to 200 NOK leads to an increase in the predicted probability of labor force participation from 
0.90 to 0.99.  
 
With real wages at 100 or 200 NOK, the probability of labor force participation varies significantly 
across different age groups and different probabilities of getting an acceptable job, given search. For 
instance, the participation rate of a female with real wage rate 100 NOK, real nonlabor income 
300,000 NOK, two children aged 4−6 years, one child aged 7−18 years and q=0.97 is reduced by 22 
percentage points, from 0.78 to 0.56, when her age increases from 30 to 45 years (Case 15 and Case 
27).  
 
The number of children and the age of each of them also have a noticeable effect on the participation 
rate. While the participation rate of a 30 year old female with real wage rate 100 NOK, real nonlabor 
income 100,000 NOK and zero children is 0.90 when q=0.92 (Case 1), the participation rate is only 
0.75 when the female, ceteris paribus, has one child aged 0−3 years (Case 7). The older the child is, 
the lower is the effect on the participation rate. For instance, if the child is 4−6 years, the participation 
rate is 0.81 (Case 4). On the other hand, if the mother has more children, two children aged 4−6 years 
and one child 7−18 years, her preferences for staying out of the labor force increases, and the 
participation rate is only 0.62 (Case 10). 
 
Quasi-elasticities of participation probability 
From Table 5 we note that whereas the nonlabor income elasticity of participation (
4
P
ZE ) does not 
show much variations, there is much more variation in the corresponding wage ( PEWE ) and 
unemployment ( (1 )
P
qE − ) elasticities.  
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By looking at the quasi-wage elasticity of participation ( PEWE ), we see that this elasticity is very small 
(0.026) for a 30 years old female with real wage rate 200 NOK, real nonlabor income of 100,000 
NOK, one child aged 0−3 years and q = 0.97 (Case 17), whereas it is as high as 1.02 for a 30 years old 
female with real wage rate equal to 100 NOK, real nonlabor income of 300,000 NOK, two children 
aged 4−6 years, one child aged 7−18 years and q=0.92 (Case 14). A shift in the real wage rate from 
100 NOK to 200 NOK leads to a significant reduction in the wage elasticity as well as the two other 
elasticities related to participation. For females with real wage rates of 200 NOK, the quasi-elasticities 
are of rather moderate size, whereas, in contrast, the elasticities for females with real wage rate 100 
NOK are of considerable magnitude. For the latter group of females with low real wage rate, we notice 
that the elasticities vary significantly with the age of the female and also with her probability of 
getting an acceptable job, given search. The elasticities are higher in absolute value for older women 
compared with younger ones.  
 
Quasi-elasticities of the discouraged worker effect 
The two last columns in Table 5 show the responses in the discouraged worker effect with respect to 
changes in the real wage rate and in real nonlabor income. The quasi-nonlabor income elasticity (
4
D
ZE ) 
is positive, but rather small for most combinations of real wages, ages, real nonlabor income, number 
of children in the three age groups and the probability of getting an acceptable job, given search. In 
contrast, the quasi-wage elasticity of the discouraged worker effect ( DEWE ) is negative, and it shows 
much more variation. It is reduced by an increase in the real wage rate, see for instance Case 7 and 
Case 8 versus Case 16 and Case 17. It is also typically reduced by an increase in the probability of 
getting an acceptable job. As for the participation wage elasticity, the number of children and the age 
of each of them are of importance for the discouraged worker wage elasticity, cf. for instance Case 1 
and Case 2; Case 4 and Case 5; Case 7 and Case 8; and Case 10 and Case 11. The wage elasticity of 
the discouraged worker effect is lower for older females than for younger ones.  
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8. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have proposed a simple search theoretic framework for rationalizing the discouraged 
worker effect, namely that labor force participation depends negatively on unemployment. In 
particular, we have demonstrated that our theory yields an explicit characterization of the value of 
searching for work as a function of the distribution of the utility of working and the arrival rate of 
acceptable job offers. Based on this framework, we have specified an empirical model for the 
probability that a person is out of the labor force, unemployed, or employed in a given period. 
Subsequently, we have estimated the model by means of a sample of independent cross-sections for 
married and cohabitating women in Norway, covering the years from 1988 to 2008. 
 
Our analysis indicates that the discouraged worker effect is of considerable magnitude. On average, 
the fraction of the subpopulation of married or cohabiting women that is discouraged is 5 percent, 
varying from about 7.6 percent in 1988−1990, to about 1.6 percent in 2006−2008. This corresponds to 
about one third of those who are out of the labor force, varying from about 36 percent in 1988−1990, 
to about 25 percent in 2006−2008. The reason why the discouraged worker effect decreases over time 
is mainly due to the increase in the participation rate, namely from 0.81 in 1988−1990, to 0.95 in 
2006−2008. Our simulation experiments demonstrate that how much the discouraged worker effect 
responds to a change in real income and the probability of getting unemployed depends substantially 
on the woman's real wage, her age and the number of children in different age groups.  
 
The estimation results show that the model explains the data very well without introducing time 
dummies for the utility of being out of the labor force. In other words, according to our model the 
increase in labor market participation from 1988 to 2008 is mainly due to the increase in the real wage. 
Due to the fact that there is little variation in the real wage rate apart from an increasing trend effect 
we cannot rule out that this trend in the real wage rate captures a possible unobserved drift in 
preferences for labor market participation. 
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Appendix A: Further estimation results 
Table A1. Estimates of the parameters in the real wage equation 
Explanatory variable Estimate t-value 
Length of schooling 0.0415 63.2885 
Experience 0.0175 27.3790 
(Experience/10)2 −0.0268 −20.3686 
Dummy for densely populated area 0.0271 9.1890 
Dummy for 1988 3.8676 258.3510 
Dummy for 1989 3.8769 267.0807 
Dummy for 1990 3.9037 270.2732 
Dummy for 1991 3.9420 275.8603 
Dummy for 1992 3.9422 271.2966 
Dummy for 1993 3.9480 279.5194 
Dummy for 1994 3.9523 278.3426 
Dummy for 1995 3.9678 277.7944 
Dummy for 1996 3.9927 280.2320 
Dummy for 1997 3.9863 272.0027 
Dummy for 1998 4.0133 274.8805 
Dummy for 1999 4.0351 277.9447 
Dummy for 2000 4.0378 274.8990 
Dummy for 2001 4.0497 274.2861 
Dummy for 2002 4.0787 276.8074 
Dummy for 2003 4.0789 276.2117 
Dummy for 2004 4.1202 277.6105 
Dummy for 2005 4.1423 274.6959 
Dummy for 2006 4.1590 271.5570 
Dummy for 2007 4.1804 264.3797 
Dummy for 2008 4.1990 284.8828 
Selection, −logP 0.0026 0.2107 
Variance of error term 0.0886 208.6418 
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Table A2. Estimates of parameters entering the probability of getting an acceptable job, condi-
tional on search  
Explanatory variable Estimate t-value 
Length of schooling 0.2717 19.1616 
Experience 0.0908 7.4278 
(Experience/10)2 −0.1084 −4.5051 
Number of children aged 0−3 years  −0.0367 −0.8400 
Number of children aged 4−6 years −0.1039 −2.2367 
Number of children aged 7−18 years −0.0987 −3.8540 
log(real nonlabor income) 0.2260 12.9338 
Dummy for 1988 
−3.3332 −10.4278 
Dummy for 1989 
−3.2879 −10.3005 
Dummy for 1990 
−3.3743 −10.3936 
Dummy for 1991 
−3.4764 −10.5414 
Dummy for 1992 
−3.5219 −10.7085 
Dummy for 1993 
−3.2850 −10.1205 
Dummy for 1994 
−3.3006 −10.2029 
Dummy for 1995 
−3.4544 −10.5567 
Dummy for 1996 
−3.3970 −10.2651 
Dummy for 1997 
−3.3256 −9.9607 
Dummy for 1998 
−3.1017 −9.1739 
Dummy for 1999 
−3.3035 −9.6494 
Dummy for 2000 
−3.1868 −9.1884 
Dummy for 2001 
−3.0551 −8.7289 
Dummy for 2002 
−3.3891 −9.7033 
Dummy for 2003 
−3.5105 −10.0073 
Dummy for 2004 
−3.6420 −10.3827 
Dummy for 2005 
−3.6552 −10.1738 
Dummy for 2006 
−3.6332 −9.9934 
Dummy for 2007 
−3.4821 −8.9531 
Dummy for 2008 
−3.3506 −8.9286 
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Appendix B: Proof of the property that the number of acceptable jobs 
follows a Bernoulli process 
By assumption the job offers arrive according to a Poisson process with arrival intensity .λ  Moreover, 
the utilities of the respective jobs are independent i.i.d. random variables. Let 2( ).tp P U V= >  Let X 
be the number of acceptable jobs. Given N job offers, the probability that x out of them are acceptable 
is Binomially distributed. Also within an interval (0, T), (say), N is Binomially distributed. Hence 
 
 ( | ) (1 ) ,x n x
n
P X x N n p p
x
−
= = = −
      
for ,x n≤  and  
 ( ) (1 ) ,n T n
T
P N n
n
λ λ − = = −    
 
for .n T≤  Consequently, the probability mass of X is given by 
 
 (1 )( ) ( | ) (1 )x n x
T
n T n
n x
n
p p
x
T
P X x EP X x N
n
λ λ− −
=
−
  
= = = = ⋅ −       
 
 ! (1 ) (1 ) .
!( )!( )!
x n x n T nT p p
x n x T n
λ λ− −= ⋅ − −
− −
  
 
Inserting ,m n x= − the last expression transforms to  
 
 
0
! ( ) ( (1 )) (1 )
! !( )!
T x
x m T x m
m
T p p
x m T x m
λ λ λ
−
− −
=
⋅ − −
− −
  
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! ( ) ( (1 )) (1 )
!( )!
T x
x m T x m
m
T xT p p
mx T x
λ λ λ
−
− −
=
− 
= ⋅ − − 
−   , 
 
which by Newton’s Binomial formula, Berck and Sydsæter (1999, Eq. (8.28)), reduces to 
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 ! ( ) ( (1 ) 1 ) ( ) (1 ) .
!( )!
x T x x T xTT p p p p
xx T x
λ λ λ λ λ− − ⋅ − + − = ⋅ − 
−    
 
The last expression above shows that the number of acceptable jobs is a Bernoulli process, such that 
the number of acceptable offers that arrives in (0, T) is Binomially distributed with parameter .pλ  
  The expected time until an acceptable job offer can readily be derived. The probability that the 
first acceptable job offer arrives at time epoch n is equal to 1(1 ) .np pλ λ−−  The corresponding 
expected value therefore equals 
 1
1
1(1 ) .n
n
n p p
p
λ λ λ
−
≥
− =  
 
To see this, note that for real s with | | 1,s < we have that 
 
 
0
1(1 ) .n
n
s
s≥
− =  
 
If we differentiate the latter equation with respect to s and subsequently put s pλ=  we get the desired 
result. 
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Appendix C: Some useful results on conditional distributions 
 
Lemma 1 
Assume that , 1,2,j j jU u j= + =ε where ε1 and ε2 are random variables with joint standard bivariate 
extreme value c.d.f.  
(C.1) ( ) ( )( )1 2/ /1 1 2 2, , 1,2 exp x xjP x x u j e e− −≤ ≤ = = − + μμ με ε , 
and ( )2 1 21 ,corr= −μ ε ε , (0,1]μ ∈ . Then  
(C.2) ( ) ( )( )2 1 1 2
1
1 exp
P U U
u u
> =
+ − μ
, 
and 
(C.3) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 22 2 1 1 2 2max , exp 1 .u u xP x U U P U U x u e e− − ≤ > = ≤ + = − +  
μμε  
 
The first part of Lemma 1, (C.2), is well known; see for example McFadden (1984). For the readers’ 
convenience, the proof is given below. 
 
Proof: 
Under the distributional assumption in (C.1), it follows that 
(C.4)  
( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ){ }( ) ( )( ) ( )( ){ } ( )( )
2 1
1
2 1 2 1 2
, ,
exp exp exp exp exp exp .
P U x x dx U y
u x u y u x u y u x dx
μ μ
μ μ μ μ μ
−
∈ + ≤
= − − + − − + − −
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Hence, 
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ){ }( ) ( )( ) ( )( ){ } ( )( )
{ } { }( ) ( )( ) ( )1 2 2 1 2
2 1 2 1
1
1 2 1 2 2
1 2/
2 1
, ,
exp exp exp exp exp exp
exp
exp ,
exp exp
u u u u ux x
P U U P U x x dx U x
u x u x u x u x u x dx
u
e e e e e e e dx
u u
∞
−∞
∞
−
−∞
∞
−
− −
−∞
> = ∈ + ≤ =
− − + − − + − −
= + − + =
+



μ μ
μ μμ μ μ μ μ
μ μ μ μ μ
μ
μ μ
  
which proves (C.2). To prove (C.3), note that it follows from (C.4) that 
(C.5) 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ){ }( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( )
1 2 2 1 2 1
1
1 2 1 2 2
max , , , , ,
exp exp exp exp exp exp .x x
P U U x x dx U U P U x x dx x U
e u u u u e u dx
−
− −
∈ + > = ∈ + >
= − + +
μ μμ μ μ μ μ
 
Furthermore, we have 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }( )1 2 1 2 1 2max , , exp exp expxP U U x P U x U x e u u−≤ = ≤ ≤ = − + μμ μ , 
which yields 
(C.6) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 2 1 2 1 2, , exp expmax exp exp exp .x xU U x x dx e u u u uP e dx− −∈ + = − + +μ μμ μ μ μ
 
By combining (C.1), (C.5) and (C.6), we obtain 
(C.7) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ){ }( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )( )
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2
max , , ,
max , ,
exp exp exp exp exp
max , , .
x x
P U U x x dx U U
P U U x x dx U U
P U U
e u u e u u dx
P U U x x dx
− −
∈ + >
∈ + > =
>
= − + +
= ∈ +
μ μμ μ μ μ  
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Consequently, we obtain 
 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ){ }( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }( )
2 2 1 2 2 2 1
1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2
1 2 1 2
max , max ,
exp exp ( ) exp exp exp 1 exp ,
P x U U P U x u U U
P U U x v U U P U U x u
x u u x x u u
≤ > = ≤ + >
= ≤ + > = ≤ +
= − − + − − = − − + −
μ μ
ε
μ μ μ
 
which completes the proof. 
Correction for selectivity bias 
We shall now discuss a particular version of Heckman's method, which is similar to Heckman (1979). 
To this end, we need to calculate 2( | ,E η ε the individual works). We assume that 
(C.8) ( )2 0.5772η ρ θε η∗= − + , 
where η∗  is a zero mean random variable that is independent of 2ε  and 0ε , and ρ  is an unknown 
parameter. The reason why we have subtracted 0.5772 (Euler’s constant) from the error term is 
because 2( ) 0.5772E θε = . If all three random variables that enter (C.8) were jointly normally 
distributed, a representation like (C.8) would always be true. However, in our case, one of the 
variables, 2 ,ε  is not normally distributed; therefore, (C.8) represents an approximation to the true 
relation. Before we proceed, we need the following result: Consider the joint distribution of the error 
term 2θε  and the event that the individual is working. We have 
 ( ) ( )2 2 0, individual works ,P x P x V U qθε θε< = < > . 
From this relation, it follows that 
 ( ) ( )2 2 0individual worksP x P x V Uθε θε< = < > . 
From Lemma 1, it follows that 
(C.9) 
( ) ( )( )
( )( )( )
2 0 0 2
2
max ,
exp 1 exp .x
P x V U P V U x v
c qZ v c e
θε θ
γ θ μ −
< > = < +
= − + − − + − 
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We realize that we can set 1μ =  in the expression in (C.9) without loss of generality. Recall that the 
expectation of a stochastic variable that follows the type III extreme value distribution ( )exp b xe −−  
equals 0.5772.b +  Consequently, it follows from (C.9) that 
 ( ) ( )( )2 0 2log 1 exp ( / 0.5772E V U Z v c q cθε γ θ> = + − − + − +   
which is equivalent to 
(C.10) ( )2 0 log 0.5772,E V U Pθε > = − +  
where we recall that P is the probability of being in the labor force. As a result of (C.10) and 
assumption (C.1), we obtain 
 ( )individual works logE Pη ρ= − . 
Hence, the regression model to be estimated on our self-selected sample is given by  
(C.11) 0log log .W X Pβ β ρ η∗= + − +  
 
Equation (C.11) is similar to Heckman's selectivity corrected wage equation, apart from being derived 
from other distributional assumptions. 
 
Consider finally the conditional variance of η  given that the individual works. Note that it follows 
from (C.9) that the variance of the conditional distribution of 2 ,θε  given that the individual works, is 
equal to the unconditional variance (which is equal to π2/6). Moreover, since η∗  is independent of the 
error terms of the decision rule that governs the labor force participation entrance, we obtain 
(C.12) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2
2
2
Var individual works Var individual works Var individual works
Var Var Var .
η ε ηρ
ρ ε η η
∗
∗
= +
= + =
 
 
Hence, we have demonstrated that the variance of the error term in the wage equation is not affected 
by selection.  
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Appendix D: Supplementary calculations 
This appendix provides supplementary calculations (Table D1-Table D5) to the ones presented in the 
main part of this paper as well as 2 figures. We now explain how these additional calculations are 
related to the tables in the main part of the paper. Note that the numbering of the tables in the appendix 
begins with a capital letter referring to appendix number, while the tables in the main part of the paper 
are numbered consecutively. 
 
In Table D1 we report the share of persons outside the labor force, the share of unemployed persons 
and the share of employed persons for all years from 1988 to 2008. Note that these shares add 
identically to one. In Table 1 we report the share of employed and unemployed persons for 1995 only. 
 
In Table D2 we report summary statistics for a selection of variables for the years 1988 to 2008, 
whereas the five last rows of Table 1 contain summary statistics for 1995. 
 
Table D3 contains estimates of all the parameters in the model estimated on the full sample 
1988−2008. These estimates are also found in Table 2, Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A. For 
comparative reasons we in Table D3 also report estimates based on the sub-sample period 1988−2002. 
 
In Table D4 we report mean quasi-elasticities related to participation P(q) and the discouraged worker 
effect P(1)-P(q) for all years in the time span 1988 to 2008, whereas Table 4 contains such 
information for the years 1988, 1995, 2002 and 2008.  
 
In Table 5 we report the predicted probability of labor force participation and quasi-elasticities related 
to participation and the discouraged worker effect for 31 groups of women. Totally in Table D5 we 
consider 117 cases. Not all cases in Table 5 are included in Table D5. Instead, Table D5 shows the 
effects of larger variations in the covariates (in particular the number of children in different age 
intervals).  
 
The estimated parameters of the wage equation are reported in Table A1. Here we display two figures, 
Figure D1 and Figure D2, which are based on the residuals of the wage equation, cf. *itη  in the 
unnumbered equation at the beginning of Section 6 in the main part of the paper.    
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Tables 
Table D1. Share of total number of persons in different labor market states 
Year Outside the  
labor force 
Unemployed Employed 
1988 0.2012 0.0147 0.7841 
1989 0.1825 0.0245 0.7930 
1990 0.1791 0.0179 0.8030 
1991 0.1582 0.0272 0.8146 
1992 0.1627 0.0289 0.8084 
1993 0.1306 0.0287 0.8407 
1994 0.1424 0.0234 0.8341 
1995 0.1319 0.0286 0.8394 
1996 0.1189 0.0266 0.8545 
1997 0.1116 0.0238 0.8646 
1998 0.0952 0.0166 0.8883 
1999 0.1106 0.0110 0.8785 
2000 0.0886 0.0153 0.8960 
2001 0.0789 0.0127 0.9084 
2002 0.0904 0.0129 0.8966 
2003 0.0848 0.0203 0.8949 
2004 0.0722 0.0221 0.9057 
2005 0.0630 0.0242 0.9128 
2006 0.0703 0.0163 0.9134 
2007 0.0514 0.0069 0.9416 
2008 0.0449 0.0101 0.9450 
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Table D2. Summary statistics of selected variables 
Year Statistic Real wage 
rate 
Real non-
labor 
income 
Age Length of 
schooling
No. of 
children 
aged 0-3 
years
No. of 
children 
aged 4-6 
years
No. of 
children 
aged 7-18 
years 
Dummy 
for region
1988 Mean 103.4 183,410 41.2 10.9 0.23 0.20 0.76 0.77
 Std. dev. 33.0 79,865 9.4 2.4 0.50 0.44 0.90 0.42
 Min  32.1 90 25 6 0 0 0 0
 Max 251.3 495,167 60 20 3 2 4 1
 # obs. 1,869 2,515 2,515 2,515 2,515 2,515 2,515 2,515
1989 Mean 104.0 181,535 40.6 11.0 0.26 0.20 0.76 0.76
 Std. dev. 34.2 78,589 9.5 2.4 0.53 0.43 0.91 0.43
 Min  35.6 173 25 6 0 0 0 0
 Max 320.0 518,227 60 20 3 2 5 1
 # obs. 2,490 3,309 3,309 3,309 3,309 3,309 3,309 3,309
1990 Mean 108.8 184,808 41.3 11.2 0.24 0.20 0.79 0.76
 Std. dev. 36.4 79,020 9.2 2.6 0.50 0.44 0.91 0.43
 Min  36.6 250 25 6 0 0 0 0
 Max 348.3 556,812 60 20 3 3 5 1
 # obs. 2,745 3,579 3,579 3,579 3,579 3,579 3,579 3,579
1991 Mean 112.5 185,637 41.1 11.3 0.26 0.20 0.79 0.75
 Std. dev. 37.1 86,127 9.2 2.6 0.53 0.43 0.94 0.43
 Min  43.6 245 25 6 0 0 0 0
 Max 336.1 586,645 60 20 3 3 5 1
 # obs. 2,831 3,641 3,641 3,641 3,641 3,641 3,641 3,641
1992 Mean 113.7 192,916 41.6 11.4 0.24 0.20 0.81 0.75
 Std. dev. 39.8 91,125 9.0 2.6 0.50 0.44 0.94 0.43
 Min  38.6 157 25 6 0 0 0 0
 Max 461.8 585,174 60 20 3 2 6 1
 # obs. 2,761 3,565 3,565 3,565 3,565 3,565 3,565 3,565
1993 Mean 113.3 188,065 40.8 11.5 0.30 0.20 0.80 0.75
 Std. dev. 38.3 89,738 9.3 2.6 0.56 0.43 0.95 0.43
 Min  37.5 77 25 6 0 0 0 0
 Max 367.5 613,993 60 20 3 3 6 1
 # obs. 3,119 3,873 3,873 3,873 3,873 3,873 3,873 3,873
1994 Mean 114.3 189,919 40.9 11.5 0.30 0.23 0.75 0.77
 Std. dev. 38.7 88,717 9.3 2.6 0.56 0.47 0.92 0.42
 Min  40.5 76 25 6 0 0 0 0
 Max 419.4 621,121 60 20 3 3 5 1
 # obs. 3,158 3,967 3,967 3,967 3,967 3,967 3,967 3,967
1995 Mean 117.5 198,031 41.0 11.9 0.31 0.23 0.76 0.76
 Std. dev. 40.8 92,513 9.2 2.7 0.56 0.47 0.93 0.43
 Min  44.2 148 25 6 0 0 0 0
 Max 395.7 669,920 60 20 3 3 5 1
 # obs. 3,221 4,017 4,017 4,017 4,017 4,017 4,017 4,017
1996 Mean 121.1 202,979 41.0 12.0 0.30 0.23 0.77 0.76
 Std. dev. 42.7 96,071 9.3 2.7 0.55 0.46 0.94 0.43
 Min  42.6 147 25 6 0 0 0 0
 Max 454.5 700,312 60 20.0 4 2 8 1
 # obs. 2,751 3,340 3,340 3,340 3,340 3,340 3,340 3,340
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Table D2 (continued) 
Year Statistic Real 
wage rate 
Real non-
labor 
income 
Age Length of 
schooling
No. of 
children 
aged 0-3 
years
No. of 
children 
aged 4-6 
years
No. of 
children 
aged 7-18 
years 
Dummy 
for region
1997 Mean 119.4 207,132 40.9 12.0 0.31 0.24 0.79 0.74
 Std. dev. 38.1 102,665 9.2 2.6 0.56 0.48 0.97 0.44
 Min  28.4 356 25 6 0 0 0 0
 Max 395.4 724,098 60 20 3 3 7 1
 # obs. 2,043 2,437 2437 2,437 2,437 2,437 2,437 2,437
1998 Mean 123.2 213,547 41.5 11.99 0.31 0.23 0.78 0.76
 Std. dev. 40.5 100,267 9.42 2.64 0.55 0.46 0.97 0.43
 Min  36.0 1,119 25 6 0 0 0 0
 Max 436.1 768,440 60 20 3 2 6 1
 # obs. 1,812 2,112 2,112 2,112 2,112 2,112 2,112 2,112
1999 Mean 129.1 218,923 41.4 12.3 0.31 0.22 0.77 0.74
 Std. dev. 48.5 107,802 9.46 2.72 0.56 0.46 0.98 0.44
 Min  37.2 616 25 6 0 0 0 0
 Max 482.3 817,057 60 20 3 3 8 1
 # obs. 1,784 2,098 2,098 2,098 2,098 2,098 2,098 2,098
2000 Mean 127.9 221,905 42.2 12.2 0.28 0.21 0.77 0.76
 Std. dev. 42.1 108,382 9.38 2.72 0.54 0.45 0.98 0.43
 Min  37.6 798 25 6 0 0 0 0
 Max 377.7 853,378 60 20 3 2 5 1
 # obs. 1,805 2,087 2,087 2,087 2,087 2,087 2,087 2,087
2001 Mean 130.5 230,601 42.0 12.5 0.3 0.23 0.76 0.76
 Std. dev. 43.3 114,113 9.3 2.75 0.55 0.48 0.96 0.43
 Min  40.2 776 25 6 0 0 0 0
 Max 438.7 883,351 60 20 3 3 7 1
 # obs. 1,863 2,128 2,128 2,128 2,128 2,128 2,128 2,128
2002 Mean 135.5 236,136 42.3 12.5 0.28 0.22 0.78 0.77
 Std. dev. 46.0 119,495 9.48 2.71 0.53 0.45 0.99 0.42
 Min  44.8 640 25 6 0 0 0 0
 Max 480.8 921,201 60 20 3 3 7 1
 # obs. 1,876 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167 2,167
2003 Mean 136.5 242,309 42.6 12.6 0.28 0.21 0.8 0.78
 Std. dev. 46.4 125,704 9.54 2.76 0.55 0.44 0.99 0.42
 Min  32.3 612 25 6 0 0 0 0
 Max 426.4 1,001,500 60 20 3 2 6 1
 # obs. 1,705 1,970 1,970 1,970 1,970 1970 1,970 1,970
2004 Mean 143.3 248,826 43.0 12.7 0.2 0.2 0.82 0.75
 Std. dev. 50.6 132,185 9.39 2.75 0.44 0.44 0.97 0.43
 Min  34.0 131 25 6 0 0 0 0
 Max 501.4 1,008,552 60 20 2 2 5 1
 # obs. 1,783 2,035 2,035 2,035 2,035 2,035 2,035 2,035
2005 Mean 144.7 255,517 42.9 12.8 0.27 0.21 0.79 0.78
 Std. dev. 45.5 135,670 9.34 2.77 0.54 0.45 0.96 0.42
 Min  49.1 369 25 6 0 0 0 0
 Max 434.6 1,033,620 60 20 3 2 4 1
  # obs. 1,756 1984 1,984 1,984 1,984 1,984 1,984 1,984
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Table D2 (continued) 
Year Statistic Real 
wage rate 
Real non-
labor 
income 
Age Length of 
schooling
No. of 
children 
aged 0-3 
years
No. of 
children 
aged 4-6 
years
No. of 
children 
aged 7-18 
years 
Dummy 
for region
2006 Mean 149.4 268,684 42.9 12.9 0.25 0.21 0.85 0.77
 Std. dev. 48.0 136,080 9.35 2.73 0.52 0.45 1.01 0.42
 Min  34.2 891 25 6 0 0 0 0
 Max 376.6 1,066,317 60 20 3 2 5 1
 # obs. 1,675 1,905 1,905 1,905 1,905 1,905 1,905 1,905
2007 Mean 157.6 272,085 42.8 13.6 0.29 0.2 0.83 0.78
 Std. dev. 53.2 132,355 9.5 2.63 0.55 0.43 0.99 0.41
 Min  51.3 466 25 6 0 0 0 0
 Max 511.7 902,559 60 20 3 2 5 1
 # obs. 1,301 1,439 1,439 1,439 1,439 1,439 1,439 1,439
2008 Mean 161.4 292,542 43.1 13.8 0.26 0.21 0.86 0.78
 Std. dev. 53.0 146,412 9.19 2.57 0.52 0.45 1 0.41
 Min  55.3 589 25 6 0 0 0 0
 Max 443.1 1,094,695 60 20 3 3 5 1
  # obs. 2,981 3,272 3,272 3,272 3,272 3,272 3,272 3,272
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Table D3. Estimates of parameters using the full data set for 1988−2008 and the subsample data-
set for 1988−2002  
1988−2008 1988−2002  
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Variables entering the expression for q:  
Length of schooling 0.2717 19.1616 0.2794 16.6454
Experience 0.0908 7.4278 0.1031 7.5177
(Experience/10)2  −0.1084 –4.5051 –0.1322 –4.8976
Number of children aged 0−3 years –0.0367 –0.8400 –0.0249 –0.5034
Number of children aged 4−6 years –0.1039 –2.2367 –0.1074 –2.0067
Number of children aged 7−18 years –0.0987 –3.8540 –0.1240 –4.0613
log real nonlabor income  0.2260 12.9338 0.2360 11.8378
Dummy for 1988  –3.3332 –10.4278 –3.6076 –9.8732
Dummy for 1989  –3.2879 –10.3005 –3.5794 –9.7791
Dummy for 1990  –3.3743 –10.3936 –3.6703 –9.8328
Dummy for 1991  –3.4764 –10.5414 –3.8174 –9.9888
Dummy for 1992  –3.5219 –10.7085 –3.8693 –10.1467
Dummy for 1993  –3.2850 –10.1205 –3.6300 –9.6680
Dummy for 1994  –3.3006 –10.2029 –3.6388 –9.7182
Dummy for 1995  –3.4544 –10.5567 –3.8173 –10.0382
Dummy for 1996  –3.3970 –10.2651 –3.7651 –9.7802
Dummy for 1997  –3.3256 –9.9607 –3.6884 –9.5270
Dummy for 1998  –3.1017 –9.1739 –3.4565 –8.8570
Dummy for 1999  –3.3035 –9.6494 –3.6585 –9.1775
Dummy for 2000  –3.1868 –9.1884 –3.5518 –8.8395
Dummy for 2001  –3.0551 –8.7289 –3.4261 –8.4478
Dummy for 2002  –3.3891 –9.7033 –3.7751 –9.2430
Dummy for 2003  –3.5105 –10.0073   
Dummy for 2004  –3.6420 –10.3827   
Dummy for 2005  –3.6552 –10.1738   
Dummy for 2006  –3.6332 –9.9934   
Dummy for 2007  –3.4821 –8.9531   
Dummy for 2008  –3.3506 –8.9286   
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Table D3 (continued)   
1988−2008 1988−2002  
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Variables entering the real wage equation:  
Length of schooling 0.0415 63.2885 0.0390 51.2386
Experience 0.0175 27.3790 0.0162 21.9481
(Experience/10)2 −0.0268 –20.3686 −0.0251 –16.5596
Dummy for densely populated area 0.0271 9.1890 0.0251 7.7436
Dummy for 1988  3.8676 258.3510 3.9187 230.0770
Dummy for 1989  3.8769 267.0807 3.9286 236.3089
Dummy for 1990  3.9037 270.2732 3.9543 239.1169
Dummy for 1991  3.9420 275.8603 3.9926 244.3919
Dummy for 1992  3.9422 271.2966 3.9931 240.6759
Dummy for 1993  3.9480 279.5194 3.9996 247.0133
Dummy for 1994  3.9523 278.3426 4.0029 245.9650
Dummy for 1995  3.9678 277.7944 4.0193 245.7575
Dummy for 1996  3.9927 280.2320 4.0436 248.4667
Dummy for 1997  3.9863 272.0027 4.0375 243.1077
Dummy for 1998  4.0133 274.8805 4.0642 246.0315
Dummy for 1999  4.0351 277.9447 4.0845 247.9648
Dummy for 2000  4.0378 274.8990 4.0884 246.2095
Dummy for 2001  4.0497 274.2861 4.1006 245.4237
Dummy for 2002  4.0787 276.8074 4.1286 247.5143
Dummy for 2003  4.0789 276.2117   
Dummy for 2004  4.1202 277.6105   
Dummy for 2005  4.1423 274.6959   
Dummy for 2006  4.1590 271.5570   
Dummy for 2007  4.1804 264.3797   
Dummy for 2008  4.1990 284.8828   
Selection effect, −logP 0.0026 0.2107 –0.0074 –0.5726
  
Variance of real wage equation 0.0886 208.6418 0.0888 179.7285
  
Variables entering the expression for the  
participation probability:  
  
Predicted log real wage 4.1293 22.2685 4.7740 17.2953
Intercept –10.5602 –9.5639 –13.6246 –8.8208
Age –0.0274 –1.2168 –0.0280 –1.1699
(Age/10)2  –0.0547 –2.1339 –0.0540 –1.9767
log of real nonlabor income  –0.2884 –10.7158 –0.2884 –9.9887
Number of children aged 0−3 years –1.0466 –24.3394 –1.0590 –23.6529
Number of children aged 4−6 years –0.6929 –15.2760 –0.7058 –14.7784
Number of children aged 7−18 years –0.2734 –11.2493 –0.2725 –10.3395
Discouraged worker effect 19.0884 9.5468 16.3601 7.6368
  
Number of observations 57,440 44.835 
log-likelihood value 9,595.77 5,282.75 
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Table D4. Mean quasi-elasticities of labor market participation and discouraged worker effect 
 
Quasi-elasticity of participation probability, P(q)a 
Quasi-elasticity of discouraged 
worker effect, P(1)-P(q)b 
 
Year 
P
EWE  4
P
ZE  (1 )
P
qE −  
D
EWE  4
D
ZE  
1988 0.6011 −0.0420 −4.1457 −0.1883 0.0131 
1989 0.5779 −0.0404 −3.9159 −0.1779 0.0124 
1990 0.5434 −0.0379 −3.6612 −0.1755 0.0123 
1991 0.5079 −0.0355 −3.4078 −0.1841 0.0129 
1992 0.5130 −0.0358 −3.4736 −0.1872 0.0131 
1993 0.4677 −0.0327 −2.9741 −0.1482 0.0104 
1994 0.4649 −0.0325 −2.9865 −0.1471 0.0103 
1995 0.4570 −0.0319 −2.9659 −0.1580 0.0110 
1996 0.4158 −0.0290 −2.6132 −0.1406 0.0098 
1997 0.4131 −0.0289 −2.5323 −0.1300 0.0091 
1998 0.3603 −0.0252 −2.0956 −0.0945 0.0066 
1999 0.3472 −0.0242 −2.0505 −0.1061 0.0074 
2000 0.3278 −0.0229 −1.8634 −0.0898 0.0063 
2001 0.3024 −0.0211 −1.6724 −0.0715 0.0050 
2002 0.2992 −0.0209 −1.7016 −0.0943 0.0066 
2003 0.3111 −0.0217 −1.8138 −0.1057 0.0074 
2004 0.2674 −0.0187 −1.5360 −0.1016 0.0071 
2005 0.2604 −0.0182 −1.4900 −0.0986 0.0069 
2006 0.2402 −0.0168 −1.3685 −0.0877 0.0061 
2007 0.1768 −0.0123 −0.9308 −0.0507 0.0035 
2008 0.1536 −0.0107 −0.7889 −0.0370 0.0026 
a Cf. Eqs. (23)-(25) for formal definition of the quasi-elasticities;  b Cf. Eqs. (26)-(27) for formal definition of the quasi-
elasticities. 
 
Table D5. Probability of being in the labor force and quasi–elasticities of labor market partici-
pation and discouraged worker effect for different groups of females 
Number of children Quasi–elasticity of participation probability, 
P(q)b 
Quasi–elasticity 
of discouraged 
worker effect, 
P(1)–P(q)c Case 
Real 
wage 
ratea 
Real 
non–
labor 
incomea 
Age 
aged 
0−3 
years 
aged 
4−6 
years 
aged 
7−18 
years
Probability 
of getting 
an accept-
able job, 
given 
search, q
Probability 
of labor 
force 
partici-
pation, 
P(q) P
EWE 4
P
ZE  PuE  
D
EWE 4
D
ZE
1 100 100,000 30 0 0 0 0.92 0.897 0.382 –0.027 –2.087 –0.296 0.021
2 100 100,000 30 0 0 0 0.97 0.962 0.151 –0.011 –0.741 –0.064 0.004
3 100 100,000 30 0 0 0 1 0.979 0.087 –0.006 –0.400 
4 100 100,000 30 1 0 0 0.92 0.753 0.768 –0.054 –4.192 –0.540 0.038
5 100 100,000 30 1 0 0 0.97 0.899 0.375 –0.026 –1.843 –0.147 0.010
6 100 100,000 30 1 0 0 1 0.941 0.228 –0.016 –1.054 
7 100 100,000 30 0 1 0 0.92 0.813 0.628 –0.044 –3.429 –0.462 0.032
8 100 100,000 30 0 1 0 0.97 0.927 0.280 –0.020 –1.376 –0.114 0.008
9 100 100,000 30 0 1 0 1 0.958 0.166 –0.012 –0.767 
10 100 100,000 30 0 0 1 0.92 0.869 0.471 –0.033 –2.574 –0.359 0.025
11 100 100,000 30 0 0 1 0.97 0.951 0.194 –0.014 –0.952 –0.081 0.006
12 100 100,000 30 0 0 1 1 0.972 0.112 –0.008 –0.519 
13 100 100,000 30 1 1 1 0.92 0.537 1.027 –0.072 –5.607 –0.527 0.037
14 100 100,000 30 1 1 1 0.97 0.772 0.727 –0.051 –3.572 –0.228 0.016
15 100 100,000 30 1 1 1 1 0.859 0.499 –0.035 –2.308 
16 100 100,000 30 1 2 2 0.92 0.306 0.878 –0.061 –4.793 –0.009 0.001
17 100 100,000 30 1 2 2 0.97 0.563 1.016 –0.071 –4.992 –0.147 0.010
18 100 100,000 30 1 2 2 1 0.699 0.869 –0.061 –4.015 
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Table D5 (Continued) 
Number of children Quasi–elasticity of participation probability, 
P(q)b 
Quasi–elasticity 
of discouraged 
worker effect, 
P(1)–P(q)c Case 
Real 
wage 
ratea 
Real 
non–
labor 
incomea 
Age
aged 
0−3 
years 
aged 
4−6 
years 
aged 
7−18 
years
Probability 
of getting 
an accept-
able job, 
given 
search, q
Probability 
of labor 
force 
partici-
pation, 
P(q) P
EWE 4
P
ZE  PuE  
D
EWE 4
D
ZE
19 100 300,000 30 1 0 0 0.92 0.690 0.884 –0.062 –4.826 –0.584 0.041
20 100 300,000 30 1 0 0 0.97 0.866 0.478 –0.033 –2.350 –0.179 0.012
21 100 300,000 30 1 0 0 1 0.921 0.300 –0.021 –1.386 
22 100 300,000 30 0 1 0 0.92 0.760 0.753 –0.053 –4.114 –0.533 0.037
23 100 300,000 30 0 1 0 0.97 0.902 0.364 –0.025 –1.790 –0.144 0.010
24 100 300,000 30 0 1 0 1 0.943 0.221 –0.015 –1.020 
25 100 300,000 30 0 0 1 0.92 0.828 0.588 –0.041 –3.211 –0.437 0.031
26 100 300,000 30 0 0 1 0.97 0.933 0.256 –0.018 –1.260 –0.105 0.007
27 100 300,000 30 0 0 1 1 0.962 0.151 –0.011 –0.697 
28 100 300,000 30 1 1 1 0.92 0.458 1.025 –0.072 –5.599 –0.406 0.028
29 100 300,000 30 1 1 1 0.97 0.711 0.848 –0.059 –4.165 –0.229 0.016
30 100 300,000 30 1 1 1 1 0.816 0.619 –0.043 –2.861 
31 100 300,000 30 1 2 2 0.92 0.243 0.761 –0.053 –4.154 0.203 –0.014
32 100 300,000 30 1 2 2 0.97 0.484 1.031 –0.072 –5.067 –0.067 0.005
33 100 300,000 30 1 2 2 1 0.629 0.964 –0.067 –4.456 
34 200 100,000 30 1 0 0 0.92 0.982 0.074 –0.005 –0.407 –0.060 0.004
35 200 100,000 30 1 0 0 0.97 0.994 0.026 –0.002 –0.129 –0.012 0.001
36 200 100,000 30 1 0 0 1 0.996 0.015 –0.001 –0.067 
37 200 100,000 30 0 1 0 0.92 0.987 0.053 –0.004 –0.289 –0.043 0.003
38 200 100,000 30 0 1 0 0.97 0.996 0.018 –0.001 –0.091 –0.008 0.001
39 200 100,000 30 0 1 0 1 0.998 0.010 –0.001 –0.047 
40 200 100,000 30 0 0 1 0.92 0.991 0.035 –0.002 –0.192 –0.028 0.002
41 200 100,000 30 0 0 1 0.97 0.997 0.012 –0.001 –0.060 –0.005 0.000
42 200 100,000 30 0 0 1 1 0.998 0.007 0.000 –0.031 
43 200 100,000 30 1 1 1 0.92 0.953 0.185 –0.013 –1.008 –0.147 0.010
44 200 100,000 30 1 1 1 0.97 0.983 0.067 –0.005 –0.331 –0.030 0.002
45 200 100,000 30 1 1 1 1 0.991 0.038 –0.003 –0.175 
46 200 100,000 30 1 2 2 0.92 0.885 0.419 –0.029 –2.287 –0.322 0.022
47 200 100,000 30 1 2 2 0.97 0.958 0.168 –0.012 –0.826 –0.071 0.005
48 200 100,000 30 1 2 2 1 0.976 0.097 –0.007 –0.447 
49 250 300,000 30 0 0 0 0.92 0.996 0.015 –0.001 –0.080 –0.012 0.001
50 250 300,000 30 0 0 0 0.97 0.999 0.005 –0.000 –0.025 –0.002 0.000
51 250 300,000 30 0 0 0 1 0.999 0.003 –0.000 –0.013 
52 250 300,000 30 1 0 0 0.92 0.990 0.041 –0.003 –0.226 –0.033 0.002
53 250 300,000 30 1 0 0 0.97 0.997 0.014 –0.001 –0.071 –0.006 0.000
54 250 300,000 30 1 0 0 1 0.998 0.008 –0.001 –0.037 
55 250 300,000 30 0 1 0 0.92 0.993 0.029 –0.002 –0.160 –0.024 0.002
56 250 300,000 30 0 1 0 0.97 0.998 0.010 –0.001 –0.050 –0.005 0.000
57 250 300,000 30 0 1 0 1 0.999 0.006 –0.000 –0.026 
58 250 300,000 30 0 0 1 0.92 0.995 0.019 –0.001 –0.105 –0.016 0.001
59 250 300,000 30 0 0 1 0.97 0.998 0.007 –0.000 –0.033 –0.003 0.000
60 250 300,000 30 0 0 1 1 0.999 0.004 –0.000 –0.017 
61 250 300,000 30 1 1 1 0.92 0.974 0.105 –0.007 –0.575 –0.084 0.006
62 250 300,000 30 1 1 1 0.97 0.991 0.037 –0.003 –0.184 –0.017 0.001
63 250 300,000 30 1 1 1 1 0.995 0.021 –0.001 –0.097 
64 250 300,000 30 1 2 2 0.92 0.934 0.255 –0.018 –1.390 –0.200 0.014
65 250 300,000 30 1 2 2 0.97 0.976 0.095 –0.007 –0.469 –0.041 0.003
66 250 300,000 30 1 2 2 1 0.987 0.054 –0.004 –0.250 
67 100 300,000 45 0 1 0 0.92 0.532 1.028 –0.072 –5.616 –0.521 0.036
68 100 300,000 45 0 1 0 0.97 0.768 0.736 –0.051 –3.617 –0.229 0.016
69 100 300,000 45 0 1 0 1 0.856 0.508 –0.035 –2.346 
70 100 300,000 45 0 0 1 0.92 0.633 0.959 –0.067 –5.238 –0.590 0.041
71 100 300,000 45 0 0 1 0.97 0.834 0.571 –0.040 –2.807 –0.202 0.014
72 100 300,000 45 0 0 1 1 0.901 0.369 –0.026 –1.706 
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Table D5 (Continued) 
Number of children 
Quasi–elasticity of 
participation probability, 
P(q)b 
Quasi–elasticity 
of discouraged 
worker effect, 
P(1)–P(q)c Case 
Real 
wage 
ratea 
Real 
non–
labor 
incomea 
Age
aged 
0−3 
years 
aged 
4−6 
years 
aged 
7−18 
years 
Probability 
of getting 
an 
acceptable 
job, given 
search, q
Probability 
of labor 
force 
partici-
pation, 
P(q) P
EWE 4
P
ZE  PuE  
D
EWE 4
D
ZE
73 100 300,000 45 0 2 3 0.92 0.200 0.661 –0.046 –3.607 0.353 –0.025
74 100 300,000 45 0 2 3 0.97 0.421 1.007 –0.070 –4.946 0.007 0.000
75 100 300,000 45 0 2 3 1 0.568 1.013 –0.071 –4.684 
76 200 100,000 45 0 1 0 0.92 0.965 0.141 –0.010 –0.770 –0.113 0.008
77 200 100,000 45 0 1 0 0.97 0.988 0.051 –0.004 –0.249 –0.022 0.002
78 200 100,000 45 0 1 0 1 0.993 0.028 –0.002 –0.131 
79 200 100,000 45 0 0 1 0.92 0.976 0.095 –0.007 –0.519 –0.076 0.005
80 200 100,000 45 0 0 1 0.97 0.992 0.034 –0.002 –0.165 –0.015 0.001
81 200 100,000 45 0 0 1 1 0.995 0.019 –0.001 –0.087 
82 200 100,000 45 0 2 3 0.92 0.857 0.505 –0.035 –2.761 –0.383 0.027
83 200 100,000 45 0 2 3 0.97 0.946 0.211 –0.015 –1.038 –0.088 0.006
84 200 100,000 45 0 2 3 1 0.969 0.123 –0.009 –0.568 
85 250 300,000 45 0 0 0 0.92 0.990 0.041 –0.003 –0.222 –0.033 0.002
86 250 300,000 45 0 0 0 0.97 0.997 0.014 –0.001 –0.069 –0.006 0.000
87 250 300,000 45 0 0 0 1 0.998 0.008 –0.001 –0.036 
88 250 300,000 45 0 1 0 0.92 0.980 0.080 –0.006 –0.434 –0.064 0.004
89 250 300,000 45 0 1 0 0.97 0.993 0.028 –0.002 –0.138 –0.012 0.001
90 250 300,000 45 0 1 0 1 0.996 0.016 –0.001 –0.072 
91 250 300,000 45 0 0 1 0.92 0.987 0.053 –0.004 –0.289 –0.043 0.003
92 250 300,000 45 0 0 1 0.97 0.995 0.019 –0.001 –0.091 –0.008 0.001
93 250 300,000 45 0 0 1 1 0.998 0.010 –0.001 –0.048 
94 250 300,000 45 0 2 3 0.92 0.917 0.316 –0.022 –1.724 –0.247 0.017
95 250 300,000 45 0 2 3 0.97 0.970 0.121 –0.008 –0.596 –0.052 0.004
96 250 300,000 45 0 2 3 1 0.983 0.069 –0.005 –0.319 
97 350 300,000 45 0 0 0 0.92 0.998 0.010 –0.001 –0.056 –0.008 0.001
98 350 300,000 45 0 0 0 0.97 0.999 0.004 –0.000 –0.017 –0.002 0.000
99 350 300,000 45 0 0 0 1 1.000 0.002 –0.000 –0.009 
100 350 300,000 45 0 1 0 0.92 0.995 0.020 –0.001 –0.112 –0.017 0.001
101 350 300,000 45 0 1 0 0.97 0.998 0.007 –0.000 –0.035 –0.003 0.000
102 350 300,000 45 0 1 0 1 0.999 0.004 –0.000 –0.018 
103 350 300,000 45 0 0 1 0.92 0.997 0.013 –0.001 –0.074 –0.011 0.001
104 350 300,000 45 0 0 1 0.97 0.999 0.005 –0.000 –0.023 –0.002 0.000
105 350 300,000 45 0 0 1 1 0.999 0.003 –0.000 –0.012 
106 350 300,000 45 0 0 3 0.92 0.994 0.023 –0.002 –0.126 –0.019 0.001
107 350 300,000 45 0 0 3 0.97 0.998 0.008 –0.001 –0.039 –0.004 0.000
108 350 300,000 45 0 0 3 1 0.999 0.004 –0.000 –0.021 
109 250 250,000 55 0 0 0 0.92 0.979 0.085 –0.006 –0.467 –0.069 0.005
110 250 250,000 55 0 0 0 0.97 0.993 0.030 –0.002 –0.148 –0.013 0.001
111 250 250,000 55 0 0 0 1 0.996 0.017 –0.001 –0.078 
112 250 250,000 55 0 0 1 0.92 0.972 0.111 –0.008 –0.606 –0.089 0.006
113 250 250,000 55 0 0 1 0.97 0.990 0.039 –0.003 –0.194 –0.017 0.001
114 250 250,000 55 0 0 1 1 0.995 0.022 –0.002 –0.102 
115 250 250,000 55 0 0 3 0.92 0.953 0.184 –0.013 –1.006 –0.146 0.010
116 250 250,000 55 0 0 3 0.97 0.983 0.067 –0.005 –0.330 –0.029 0.002
117 250 250,000 55 0 0 3 1 0.991 0.038 –0.003 –0.175 
a In NOK (1998–prices); b Cf. Eqs. (23)–(25) for formal definition of the quasi–elasticities;  c Cf. Eqs. (26)–(27) for formal 
definition of the quasi–elasticities. 
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Figures 
Figure D1. QQ-plot of the residuals in the real wage equation 
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Figure D2. Density of the residuals in the real wage equation 
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